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FOREWORD 
 
This section will detail how this Major Research Paper (MRP) connects to my Plan of Study (POS). 
My stated area of concentration for my POS is the interaction between emerging technological and 
innovative business trends with that of the statutory and regulatory framework of Ontario’s 
electricity sector. The three components that I have identified to comprise my area of 
concentrations are: (1) Sustainability, Energy, and Socio-technical Transitions; (2) The Design of 
Ontario’s Electricity Market as Represented by its Rules and Regulations; and (3) Emerging 
Innovations in the Power Sector – Potential Market Participants. My MRP is directly related to all 
three components of my POS. 
 
With respect to the first component, there is a direct relationship because the primary objective of 
my MRP is to assess the sustainability transition of Ontario’s electricity system using the analytical 
framework of the socio-technical transitions lens and multi-level perspective theory. Specifically, 
my MRP details the interaction between niche-level innovation, mainly the integration of DERs 
technologies and the established electricity regime, dominated at the distribution level by Local 
Distribution Companies. 
 
With respect to the second component, there is a direct relationship, although it is incorporated 
slightly differently than initially thought. This is because I quickly realized that focusing on the 
Market Rules specifically would not be fruitful, as it contains many technical (engineering) rules 
that I would simply have nothing meaningful to contribute to. Instead, I decided to focus on the 
market structure and the various ways that it can play a role in supporting a DERs market. 
 
With respect to the third component, there is a direct relationship because I explore the different 
possibilities of how DERs markets and business models could work. I look to some pilot projects 
that were implemented by LDCs in Ontario – specifically, Alectra Utilities. I also refer to some 
recent developments in other jurisdictions where DERs are already participating in wholesale 
markets and competing against traditional sources for the provision of electricity services. Quite 
importantly, I refer to much of the DERs market activity as electricity retailing and distinguish it 
from previous retailing business models to make the case of how technological advancement has 
changed the business model and why this emerging form of retailing is desirable. 
 
My MRP is supported by the Learning Objectives that stemmed from the three components 
identified above. I have completed them all and the knowledge gained from their completion was 
instrumental in understanding and writing this MRP. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This MRP is about the sustainability transition of Ontario’s electricity system. A sustainability 
transition is understood as a type of purposive socio-technical transition, which is meant to address 
some normative goal rather than to exploit commercial opportunity. I use the analytical framework 
presented by the socio-technical transitions literature and multi-level perspective theory to assess 
the state of Ontario’s grid modernization as evidenced through primarily documentary evidence, 
most notably the 2017 Long-Term Energy Plan. I conclude that based on this evidence, Ontario is 
taking a transformation pathway, which is characterized as being driven from within the 
established regime that modifies its own trajectory in response to landscape pressures and an 
under-developed niche. This is represented by Ontario’s preferred approach to enable LDCs as the 
primary developers of DERs through regulatory changes. I then argue that in light of sustainability 
objectives that I identify in this paper, Ontario’s approach has some shortfalls, and instead I 
recommend a reconfiguration pathway that requires the strategic modification of 3 key areas to 
enable a competitive retail DERs market. The three key areas are: (1) adjustments to the grid 
architecture to address the operational and functional roles of grid actors; (2) establishment of a 
market structure known as a platform to enable the participation of distributed resources to 
compete with traditional resources on a level playing, which can be done either at the bulk or 
distribution levels; and (3) the regulation of a competitive retail DERs market in Ontario. 
 
List of Acronyms 
 
BTM = Behind-the-Meter 
DER = Distributed Energy Resource 
DSO = Distribution System Operator 
ICT = Information Communication Technology 
IESO = Independent Electricity System Operator 
LDC = Local Distribution Company 
LMP = Locational Marginal Pricing 
MOE = Minister of Energy (Ontario) 
NWS = Non-Wires Solutions 
OEB = Ontario Energy Board 
OPA = Ontario Power Authority 
OPG = Ontario Power Generation 
VPP = Virtual Power Plant 
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METHODOLOGY AND SUMMARY 
 
The purpose of this MRP is develop a case study around the sustainability transition of Ontario’s 
electricity sector in order to comment on the structural and sustainability implications of Ontario’s 
chosen approach and explore whether there is a preferable approach. Put otherwise, in this MRP I 
seek to answer the questions: (a) what is the state of Ontario’s sustainability transition in the 
electricity sector? And (b) what recommendations, if any, can be made, in light of the normative 
objectives of a sustainability transitions? I proceed to accomplish this in the following way: 
 
In Part I, I set out a normative frame around sustainability. The purpose of doing this is because 
this MRP posits that Ontario’s sustainability transition is purposive, meaning it is designed to 
achieve some normative objective, mainly sustainability. For the process of operationalizing the 
concept of sustainability so that it can be used for an analysis, I turn to Gibson et al.’s 
“sustainability assessment” exercise for guidance and subsequently use his eight sustainability 
criteria, adapted for context-specific (i.e. electricity system) purposes to inform my own three 
sustainability objectives. These objectives serve as an important benchmark since they enable me 
to conduct a rigorous analysis as to whether the transition is achieving its identified objectives. It 
should be noted that I take an expanded view of sustainability, like Gibson, looking at structural, 
social, and economic implications, in addition to environmental ones. 
 
In Part II, I start by introducing the socio-technical transitions lens and unpack the multi-level 
perspective theory. I have chosen to use this analytical framework because it is particularly well-
suited to examine the relationship between technological innovation and the social and institutional 
systems that determine how innovation becomes embedded to fulfill societal functions; it also has 
a proven track record of use in analyzing various electricity system transitions and demonstrates 
that it provides value in those analyses. I then proceed to apply the MLP framework in order to 
identify Ontario’s electricity regime, the landscape pressures being exerted upon it, and the niche 
developments that are percolating to break into the regime. I note that due to the role of rules that 
coordinate the actions of actors in this context – in essence the industry structure is established by 
a statutory framework and governed through a regulatory framework – that the niche cannot itself 
break into the regime because the rules are too restrictive causing an impasse and depend on regime 
actors to make changes to the rules. 
 
In Part III, I conduct the main analysis, where I rely on primarily documentary evidence 
supplemented by attendance at various conferences in Toronto in 2018 to comment on the state of 
Ontario’s electricity system sustainability transition. It should be noted that the documents that I 
rely on comprise part of a statutorily enshrined process that pertains to industry evolution as well 
as planning of the electricity system. Mainly, I look to Ontario’s 2017 Long-Term Energy Plan 
and following the items related specifically to DERs, I examine the Implementation Plans of the 
IESO and OEB, which are indicative of the direction that the industry is heading in Ontario. I look 
at other important pieces of evidence of things happening on the ground, such as pilot projects 
being undertaken by Alectra Utilities, such as the deployment of a utility-owned and operated 
virtual power plant, and the Electricity Distributors (trade) Association’s vision paper, which 
presents a comprehensive vision of how Ontario LDCs (vis-à-vis the EDA) envision the evolution 
of the distribution sector in Ontario. I conclude that, collectively, based on the evidence that I look 
at, Ontario is heading towards a transformation pathway as contemplated in the socio-technical 
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transitions literature. This means that innovation is being adopted in a minimal way predominantly 
by established actors. This is represented by Ontario’s chosen approach of enabling LDCs to 
deploy DERs, primarily as Non-Wires Solutions, which means that DERs compete with traditional 
infrastructure investment rather than competing for the provision of electricity services. 
 
In part IV, I continue to examine the implications of Ontario’s chosen approach in light of the 
sustainability objectives identified in Part I. I put forward that there are several shortfalls that arise 
out of Ontario’s chosen approach, mainly related to issues of limiting consumer choice and stifling 
innovation, among other factors. As an alternative, I recommend a reconfiguration pathway that 
would lead to a competitive retail DERs market in Ontario that would better address the shortfalls 
that I have identified. Relying on literature such as the MIT’s Utility of the Future report, I 
elaborate on how a more market-oriented approach could be achieved by strategically addressing 
three key areas of the sector: (1) adjustments to the grid architecture so that operational and market 
structures are well coordinated between the distribution and bulk system levels, as well as the 
functional clarification of LDCs with respect to their network and commercial aspects of the 
business; (2) establishment of a market structure known as a platform where distributed resources 
will be able to participate and compete with traditional resources on a level playing field for the 
provision of electricity services; this can be done on either the distribution or bulk levels of the 
grid; and (3) the regulation of a competitive retail DERs market in Ontario – to understand the 
basic tenets of this new business model (i.e. aggregation) and how it is distinct from previous 
electricity retailing activity.  
 
In Part V, I conclude with a reflection of how things are likely to develop in Ontario at the risk of 
departing from the current plan in the face of policy swings that have been prevalent throughout 
energy policy in Ontario over the last two decades.  
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PART I: DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES IN POWER SYSTEM 
SUSTAINABILITY TRANSITIONS 
 
1.4.   Ruminating About Sustainability: an introduction to the normative context 
 
The notion of sustainability as it is understood in the modern public conscience is at its 
core premised on the recognition that human activity has an impact on the biophysical condition 
of our planet. That is to say, the cumulative effects of our activities trigger complex feedback 
systems that express consequences of shifting climate patterns, severe weather events, and ocean 
acidification, to provide a few examples. As a matter of global policy, the landmark Report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development (also known as the Brundtland 
Comission/Report) titled “Our Common Future” in 1987 used scientific evidence and 
methodology to establish that the same economic activities and technological developments that 
led to our prosperity have also led to the “continued degradation” of the planet’s biophysical health 
and put future generations at severe risk (WCED,  1987). In response, the Report coined the term 
“sustainable development,” which implicitly captures the idea that many economic development 
activities, mainly industrial activities such as resource extraction, processing, and manufacturing, 
as well as farming, transport, construction practices, and the production and consumption of energy 
(the focus of this paper) are not sustainable (i.e. viable) in the long run because they strain the 
planet’s biophysical capacity beyond its safe limit. Thus, concedingly at the risk of sounding 
tautological, sustainability is perhaps best understood in contrast to unsustainability, whereby a 
practice is sustainable if it can be engaged in over a long period of time without (or with minimally) 
inflicting adverse impacts on the planet.  
This brings me to the second and more salient point of this paper, about sustainable 
development, which reveals that in order to achieve this normative objective, we must undertake 
a transition because our current trajectory, comprised of our cumulative practices, is unsustainable 
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(i.e. not viable in the long run). This transition may be gradual and fragmented but it must be 
executed with a conscious effort to achieving the objective of sustainability. It is this notion of a 
transition that underlies this paper and its investigation. The specific type of transition is a 
“sustainability transition” as it is called by Frank Geels in his prolific literature, which studies 
“socio-technical transitions” and forms the analytical framework for this paper as will be 
elaborated in Part II (Geels, 2011). That said, the challenge with all transitions, inherently, is that 
they necessarily involve a shift away from the routine way of doing things, which - as a matter of 
human nature - we get locked into repeating. This concept known as “path dependency” is as much 
true and relevant on a collective scale as it is on an individual one; and a collective scale invariably 
includes organizations and institutions that are governed through internal policies, guidelines, and 
bureaucracies. Robert Gibson eloquently and adequately captures this principle in the context of 
sustainability, when he says that: “[C]urrent sustainability efforts… are also attempts to push us 
onto a different and more hopeful path as such they are an attack on entrenched habits and 
structures of decision-making.” (Gibson, 2006). 
In summary, as the above indicates, this paper is about achieving sustainability (i.e. long 
term viability) in an industrial sector of the economy, mainly the provision of electrical energy, 
through a sustainability transition. Furthermore, we have seen that a transition of this sort requires 
a structural shift away from current decision-making practices in many areas of the sector, such as 
planning, generation, and consumption, to name a few examples. The remainder of this section 
will focus on operationalizing the concept of sustainability by identifying context-specific 
objectives for power system evolution (i.e. the values that a power system sustainability transition 
seeks to achieve) and why a transition towards a decentralized grid (i.e. a power system with a 
high penetration of Distributed Energy Resources – DERs), a concept that will be elaborated 
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below, sufficiently addresses and fulfils these objectives, thereby making it a desirable plan to 
consciously pursue when thinking about policy with respect to Ontario’s electricity sector. 
 
1.5.   Operationalizing Sustainability: identifying the objectives of a power system 
sustainability transition 
 
Although this paper takes a conceptual approach to analyzing the sustainability transition 
of Ontario’s power system, it is nonetheless important to functionally define what a sustainability 
transition is and identify the context-specific sustainability objectives that an electricity system 
sustainability transitions seeks to achieve (i.e. sustainability objectives) so that they may be readily 
applied for a rigorous analysis. According to Geels, sustainability transitions, understood as deep 
structural changes to the electricity system, are distinct from other socio-technical transitions that 
have occurred throughout history. Meanwhile, socio-technical transitions are understood as being 
changes in the way technology is implemented to fulfil societal functions (this will be exposited 
in detail in Part II) (Geels, 2011; 2002). Mainly, Geels refers to the following three distinguishing 
points in reference to sustainability transition: First and foremost, they are purposive, specifically 
in that “they are meant to address persistent environmental concerns” (Geels, 2011). As I will 
demonstrate below, this paper takes a broader approach to sustainability outlined by the three 
sustainability objectives that will follow. This is in contrast to other transitions which were more 
emergent, meaning that they were based on “exploiting commercial opportunity related to new 
technology” (Geels, 2011). Put otherwise, the goal of sustainability transitions is the collective 
good and there (often but not always, as I present in this paper) little incentive for individuals. 
Second, sustainability transitions do not offer obvious user benefits in the short term so it is 
unlikely that environmental innovation will be able to “replace existing system without changes in 
economic framing conditions, such as changes in policy and resistance from vested interests” 
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(Geels, 2011). And Third, “in the market domain where large firms compete with complementary 
assets serving economies of scope and scale, sustainability innovators require strategic 
reorientation with support from regime actors who defend the existing regime” (Geels, 2011). As 
Geels further points out in providing guidance on sustainability transition, these factors “make it 
imperative for the analyst to explore the interaction between multiple dimensions including 
technology, public policy and politics, economic and market developments, and [even] culture.” 
(Geels, 2011). This reinforces the importance of the role of social agency on an organizational 
basis in technological development and deployment. 
In this light, that sustainability transitions are designed to achieve certain normative 
outcomes, it is helpful to bring back to the forefront the mischief that sustainability is attempting 
to solve for as these principles comprise the sustainability objectives that the power system 
transition being analyzed in this paper are designed to achieve. Once again echoing the words of 
Gibson, “Essentially, the present concept of sustainability is a response to evidence that current 
conditions and trends are not viable in the long run, and that the reasons for this are as much social 
and economic as they are biophysical and ecological.” (Gibson, 2006). Gibson makes these 
comments in the context of a sustainability assessment, which is a distinct mode of analysis for 
policy evaluation that this paper will not undertake to complete. However, I will borrow certain 
concepts to inform my analysis. Mainly, the sustainability assessment begins by taking the eight 
general sustainability criteria proposed by Gibson et al. in the seminal literature regarding 
sustainability assessments and adapting them to become context-specific criteria than can be 
readily applied to any specific policy evaluation. The quote above reveals that the sustainability 
criteria stem from biophysical and ecological concerns as well as social and economic ones. That 
said, the sustainability criteria have already been adapted to the context of power system planning 
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in a policy evaluation conducted by Mark Winfield (Winfield, 2016). As a result, I will turn to 
Winfield’s analysis for guidance and to the context-specific criteria used in his analysis to inform 
and adapt into the sustainability objectives that I will use for this paper’s analysis. Based on 
Winfield’s analysis I have distilled, bundled, and adapted the criteria into the following three core 
sustainability objectives (based on Gibson, 2006; and Winfield, 2016):  
 
Sustainability Objective #1: Environmental Integrity 
The first objective is focused on the quintessential focus of sustainability, which is 
environmental protection and preservation of the biophysical landscape and ecological 
ecosystems. This objective recognizes and values the intangible benefits derived from the natural 
world, as well as the fundamental truth of the inter-dependent relationship between the human and 
otherwise non-human, ecological environment. This objective is concerned with protecting 
against, minimizing, and avoiding: greenhouse gas emissions and the emissions of other noxious 
fumes; pollutants in general deposited in either soil, water, or air; the natural habitats and 
conditions that wild flora and fauna depend on; and other natural landscapes and resources 
contained in forests, oceans, and the artic that provide ecosystem services such as regulating sea 
levels and maintaining stable climate patterns through the natural movements of the Earth’s 
weather system and its capacity to find equilibrium. This ties back to the notion that human activity 
offsets these natural patterns, which then have ripple effects when thrown off balance that can be 
catastrophic for the conditions that humans, animals, and plants depend on in their natural 
environment. In other words, achieving this objective involves the protection of irreplaceable life 
support function upon which human and ecological well-being depend. 
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Sustainability Objective #2: Economic Responsibility and Adaptive Capacity 
The second objective is more closely connected to the social and economic aspects of 
sustainability, as mentioned by Gibson above, in contrast to the first objective. This objective 
focuses on maximizing market efficiency and cost-effectiveness when making planning decisions, 
as well as ensuring prudence, precaution, and adaptation in the outcome. Put otherwise, 
implementing this objective in decision making means respecting factors such as “the efficiency 
of energy production, delivery, and use by maximizing use of underutilized facilities, resources, 
capacities, and minimizing requirements for additional supporting infrastructure, as well as 
minimizing governance burdens and costs (e.g. regulatory and administrative).” (Winfield, 2016). 
In a world of rapidly changing technologies, this objective values “the flexibility to pursue and 
adopt new technologies and methodologies to avoid lock-in, to be cognizant of the demand for 
material, energy, and ecological system services, and reducing the cost of provisions such as 
maintenance, operational, capital costs, and risk.” (Winfield, 2016). This objective also prioritizes 
“the need to achieve technological system reliability and resiliency through [strategies such as] the 
minimization of vulnerability and maximization of modularity and diversification of fuel and 
technology.” (Winfield, 2016). In other words, structures of decision making need to maintain a 
high degree of adaptive capacity in the face of uncertainty and the minimize path dependence. This 
means improving the ability to adapt to changing circumstances including externally generated 
changes and “minimizing commitments to high path-dependency large-scale, capital intensive 
supply options.” (Winfield, 2016). 
 
Sustainability Objective #3: Distributional Effects, Innovation, and Individual 
Choice 
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The third objective, similar to the second one, is more closely connected to the economic 
and social aspects of sustainability, with this third objective being more closely concerned with 
the social impacts of economic choices. Broadly speaking, this objective emphasizes the need to 
consider livelihood sufficiency and opportunity, intra- and intergenerational equity, and 
democratic governance. Specifically, these values are manifested by outcomes such as the reliable 
and affordable provision of energy services, associated economic development opportunities and 
risks, and equitable outcomes with respect to consumption patterns, wealth, and impacts of 
electricity costs and pricing allocation among consumer groups. That said, as the topic of 
distributional effects is often contested due to different assumptions about the impacts of market 
economics, it is worthy to make clear that my own perspective on these factors favours market 
forces and market-based solutions as opposed to more interventionist approaches such as direct 
redistributions. Additionally, open markets create business opportunities for new and innovative 
entrants that could provide services that were otherwise not offered prior and increase livelihood 
opportunities through new revenue models that are accessible to more people due to lower barriers 
to entry. This is why, for the purposes of this paper, this third objective values innovation and the 
reduction of decision making to the lower levels that would afford greater individual choice, and 
in my opinion these these factors would be better served through competitive markets, which may 
differ from the perspective taken by Gibson.  
 
1.6.   The Desirability of DER: How DERs contribute to achieving the sustainability objectives 
The three themes outlined above collectively show that sustainability objectives are far 
more encompassing than simply concern for environmental impacts, and as such warrant much 
deeper investigation and contemplation of a wider range of solutions, than earlier sustainability 
	   15	  
oriented solutions related to the power sector such as fuel switching alone. One of solutions is 
greater decentralization in the power grid through DERs, which I will explain in this section. 
However, before proceeding to do so it important to ground an understanding of what DER is 
before understanding how its characteristics meet the sustainability objectives. The Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) Energy Initiative published in 2016 a comprehensive report about 
the future role of the utility in the overall architecture and supply chain of the electricity grid, 
which this paper will touch upon as well in Part IV.  
The MIT report posited that a primary driver that is causing the utility business model to 
change, and a change in the electricity industry generally, are the proliferation of DERs (MIT, 
2016). It explains DERs as “any resource capable of providing electricity services that is located 
in the distribution system.” (MIT, 2016). These resources can exist either primarily for reasons 
other than to provide electricity services while others are installed specifically to provide them 
(MIT, 2016). This paper will return to what is meant by “electricity services” in Part IV, however, 
in the meantime, these services can be understood to mean a range of options from demand 
response (i.e. dispatchable load), generation, energy storage, and energy control devices. That said 
it is much easier to envision DERs that are made specifically to provide electricity services like 
solar PV panels while it can be more difficult to imagine DERs that are meant primarily to provide 
services other than electricity but can do so. Some examples of this type of DER include plug-in 
electric vehicle, which are meant to provide transportation services, however when plugged in can 
provide storage services. Another example is a “Smart Home” device that if connected to power 
switches of a home or office can provide demand response services by turning down air 
conditioning, lighting, and other electric appliances. These forms of DERs can be highly effective 
especially when aggregated. The significances of DERs is twofold: first, that they can be used to 
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form a microgrid, which is a self-sufficient electricity grid that can be islanded; and second, due 
to the characteristics of these resources, they can be locally sited and often seamlessly placed 
behind the meter and owned by individual customers, therefore diffusing costs. Now I will move 
on to how they contribute to the sustainability objectives identified above. 
One: Environmental Integrity 
 This objective values the socio-ecological system integrity by recognizing the often 
intangible ecological system services that we receive and thus aim to protect and preserve the 
conditions in which these ecosystems thrive, which in return maintain the conditions that humans 
need to survive; this is a symbiotic relationship (not really because humans harm wild flora and 
fauna). Thus it is important to protect the biophysical condition from noxious fumes, pollutants, 
and landscape degradation. One of the main direct benefits of DERs (but not all DERs) is that they 
are small-scale renewable generators such as rooftop (or not) solar PV panels or farms or wind 
farms. These are effectively non-emitting resources, which do not spew out any greenhouse gases 
in their process of generation. Another direct benefit, is the that for many types of DER, they can 
be sited without altering or reshaping or the site or land and for the most part they are non-invasive 
(i.e. rooftop solar, EV, etc.). The land component is a significant benefit that even hydro-
generating stations cannot claim to possess as they require extensive alteration to build a hydro-
electric dam. However, by the same virtue certain key materials that are used in the construction 
of some DERs such as solar PV panels and batteries can also have negative impacts as they need 
to be mined, thus required further study and a balanced approach (Hernandez et al., 2014). Putting 
that aside, as a more indirect benefit, DERs that can provide demand response services have to 
potential to offset the need for the use of so-called “peaker plants” which are often fossil fuels 
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generators that are used in times of peak demand, as well as offsetting the need for building new 
generation, which is also often fossil fuels such as natural gas (Lovins, 1977; 2003).  
Two: Economic Responsibility and Adaptive Capacity 
 This objective values the economic effects of decision-making and other consequences 
such as lock-in. This means achieving cost-effectiveness choices that are designed with modularity 
and diversification of fuel and technologies in order to maintain maximum system resiliency and 
utility, minimize maintenance, and deliver efficiently with a minimal need for additional 
supporting infrastructure. Arguably, this is the greatest benefit of DER and a decentralized grid 
generally, which is that it can achieve the effect of solving local issues, whether in reliability or 
simply being self-sufficient for supply, at a local scale. This avoids overbuilding at the 
transmission level, which has the adverse effects of congesting transmission lines and thus 
reducing the efficiency of delivery and the effectiveness of the resources. That said, this is not a 
new idea. DERs have been advocated for for a long time, especially by prominent energy thinker 
Amory Lovins, who is credited as the herald of “soft energy paths” (Lovins, 1977).  
In his 2003 book, “Small is Profitable: The Hidden Economic Benefits of Making 
Electrical Resources the Right Size,” as the title suggests, Lovins diligently makes the case for 
what is essentially a decentralized power grid, which this paper will follow (Lovins, 2003). In 
essence, Lovins argues that properly sited DER has the ability to “right-size” the grid by being 
able to better target and alleviate local needs (Lovins, 2003). This is because (a) onsite power can 
provide supply directly to loads (and sized correctly to meet the tailored needs) reducing aggregate 
demand from the centralized generation of the bulk system, (b) properly sited resources can help 
address congestion and thermal constraints on the distribution grid by providing reactive power 
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where it is needed most, and (c) there are minimal losses or contribution to additional congestion 
on existing pathways (Lovins, 2003).  
Furthermore, with the proper economic signals such as locational marginal pricing (a 
concept to be elaborated on in Part IV), needs can be adequately supplied at a much more cost-
effective manner (Tabors et al., 2018); this is in line with the reasoning that was adopted when 
power generation was unbundled and deregulated and market opening. This is also evident by 
observing the Hourly Ontario Energy Price (HOEP) set through the IESO’s spot markets. An LMP 
would improve on this even further, as the IESO states in its Market Renewal Program because it 
would provide more accurate pricing signals because they would be able to be computed on a more 
granular scale, with less variables and thus less uncertainty to model the price on (IESO, 2017). 
However, this will be elaborated on extensively in Part IV. A clear illustration of the benefits of 
“right-sizing” is the advent of Non-Wires Solutions (NWS) where distributors can call upon DER, 
either already installed behind-the-meter or install new resources, to solve local problems, which 
can often be significantly cheaper than traditional infrastructure capital investments (Navigant 
Consulting, 2018).  
One way this might work is because if the specific resource or resources are customer 
owned then the entire value of the asset does not need to be pushed off and recovered through the 
rate-base with the additional top-up for the rate of return on the investment that regulators allow 
and instead only need to pay for the cost of the service being provided. This concept will be 
expanded on in Part III. Lastly, the modular and diverse nature (in terms of technology and fuel) 
of DERs makes the design of a decentralized grid resilient because the connectivity of resources 
enables the re-routing of power in case of isolated power failures, congestion, and severe weather 
storms (Lovins, 2003). DERs also contributes to adaptive capacity because individual resources 
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may be easily replaced with relatively low cost and short installation timelines making resource 
maintenance simpler and more cost-effective (Navigant Consulting, 2018). 
Three: Distributional Effects, Innovation, and Individual Choice 
This objective values the spreading of costs and diffusion of benefits equitably and fairly. 
It is also concerned with respecting decision making by those who are impacted by the decision, 
as well as creating opportunities in business, commerce, and self-sufficiency. The two most 
relevant points that DER and a decentralized grid can contribute to are distribution of costs for the 
system and decision making as well as creating commercial opportunity and self-sufficiency. In 
regards to distribution of costs, it was touched upon in the paragraph immediately above that 
through the use of arrangements such as NWS, investments into the grid can be made by willing 
third parties or developers who will pay for DERs but will also be entitled to the benefits through 
profits made from providing grid services. In a more advanced scenario (that will be explored later 
in this paper), real estate owners, whether residential, commercial, or just land, can purchase and 
install DER on their site for their own benefit, but also with the proper system in place can profit 
from providing services to the grid. This could help avoid having to centrally procure expensive 
contracts for capacity that are socialized in costs throughout the entire jurisdiction as is the case 
with Global Adjustment (GA) payments in Ontario. Additionally, as DERs increasingly occupy 
the distribution grid they provide self-sufficiency at more granular, local scales (i.e. at the 
individual site level if there is enough generation capacity installed, or on a microgrid level 
encompassing a neighbourhood or a municipality), which means that, conceptually at least, 
governance and decision-making can be downloaded and carried out on more local levels such as 
agencies as distributors or other aggregations of resources (MIT, 2016); this too will be explored 
in Parts IV and V. In terms of commercial opportunity, this is also a speculative point, but 
	   20	  
conceptually a decentralized grid can open business opportunity that the traditional monopoly-
granted utility did not. This would be in the form of DER equipment providers who may act as 
aggregators and brokers that provide services on larger scales to the grid, that can effectively be 
thought of as retailers if they are selling electricity services to end users through the resources that 
they deploy on the host’s site (MIT, 2016). This too will be extensively elaborated on in Part IV. 
Summary  
To summarize, it is useful to maintain a contextual frame that is captured in this quote by Winfield 
on the importance of sustainability planning in the electricity sector: 
 “Electricity supply, transmission, and conservation systems present particularly 
complex planning challenges and risks. They require long-term capital investments, 
and carry risks of technological and institutional choices, and their accompanying 
environmental, economic, social and technological consequences may be embedded 
over very long time periods. In addition to these risks of high path dependence and 
negative resilience, electricity planning needs to respect and environment of rapid 
technological development, increasing uncertainty about future energy needs, and the 
relationship between electricity and other energy resources, such as fossil fuels.” 
(Winfield, 2016). 
 
This quote can be seen to implicitly support the objectives mentioned above that signify, in my 
opinion, a shift towards a partially but not entirely decentralized grid, meaning that there is an 
increase in the embedding of energy resources at the distribution level, shifting the way the grid 
operates technically but also prompting adjustments to be made in the way we govern and 
regulate the grid. The next part of this paper will focus on the analytical framework, which is 
used for analyzing socio-technical and sustainability transitions. 
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PART II: SOCIO-TECHNICAL TRANSITIONS & ONTARIO’S 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
 
 
2.1. Socio-technical Transitions: an introduction to the analytical framework 
 
In the first part of this paper, I established the case for why transitioning to a decentralized 
power grid, characterized by a high penetration of DERs, is desirable from a sustainability 
perspective. In this part, I will expound the analytical framework that I will use to assess the state 
and progress of Ontario’s grid modernization process in Part III.  The benefit of using Geels et al. 
literature on Socio-technical Transitions and Multi-Level Perspective, is that this framework 
enables the analyst to characterize the observed structural changes that are occurring in the sector 
under a transitional pathway, thereby providing insight into the structural process and therefore be 
able to understand what steps need to be taken in order to continue the desired transitional 
trajectory, or otherwise adjust the process to reach a different objective or simply reach the same 
objective through alternative methods.  
 
The Basics of Socio-technical Transitions and Multi-Level Perspective 
In broad strokes, the study of socio-technical transitions provides a mode of analysis to help 
understand and explain Technological Transitions (TT). TT are defined as “major technological 
transformations in the way societal functions are fulfilled”, which “not only involve technological 
changes, but also changes in elements such as user practices, regulation, industrial networks, 
infrastructure, and symbolic meaning” (Geels, 2002). The main aspects of TT that this mode seeks 
to address are: How do TT come about? And are there particular patterns and mechanisms in the 
transition process? To answer this, Socio-technical transitions literature applies an 
interdisciplinary approach borrowing principles from the sociology of technology and 
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evolutionary economics, rooted in the assumption that in itself, technology has no power, rather 
“only in association with human agency, social structures, and organizations does technology fulfil 
functions.” (Geels, 2002). The inclusion of “socio-” contained in the study of socio-technical 
transition encapsulates this inextricable link between technological systems and the social context 
of human agency (Geels, 2002).  
To elaborate on this, I turn to the work of Frank Geels, who consolidated much of the 
literature that comprises this “appreciative” theory (i.e. integrates interdisciplinary concepts) and 
demonstrated the operability of this highly fluid and abstract theory against the context of 
historically significant transitions (Geels, 2004). Geels initially points to the notions of the 
“seamless web” and “configurations that work.” (Geels, 2002). These visual aids help 
conceptualize and model the realm in which technological transitions take place as a network of 
heterogeneous elements that include human and non-human artefacts (Geels, 2002). These 
elements are the technological artefacts themselves, as well as the socially constructed systems in 
which they exist and arguably serve, such as human organizations and human agents that, grouped 
separately, produce, replicate, and consume the technology in the operations of their lives among 
society (Geels, 2004). They are collectively embedded and enunciated through rules, which 
reinforce the routine behaviours that are experienced everyday. (Geels, 2004). Rules are 
understood as a set of cognitive algorithms that prescribe a narrow set of acceptable behaviours, 
or paths, within contexts (Geels, 2004).  
The early work on technological systems focused on the rules that bind organizations such 
as firms and institutions. However, rules serve a function more powerful than an adhesive because 
the repetition of rules through routine behaviour entrenches or normalizes them and provides the 
stability that characterizes the regime (Geels, 2004). A technological transition is thus understood 
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as the substitution of certain elements within the network that probes a readjustment of the other 
elements in order for the new configuration to be embedded as it fulfills the societal function.   
In order to conduct an analysis and assess the state of a given Socio-technical Transition, 
the theory applies the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) framework to the set of observed facts, 
which must be rationalized as they allow for a great extent of discretion and flexibility in their 
characterization. The MLP is a visually heuristic construct that involves three tiers or levels of 
concentric networks that form a “nested hierarchy”, where there is interaction between the tiers as 
well as within the tiers (Geels, 2002). The macro tier is called the landscape level, the micro tier 
is called the niche level, and the meso-level pressed in between is called the socio-technical regime 
(Geels, 2002). The specifics of each tier are as follows: 
Regime: 
The socio-technical regime as stated above is the logical evolution of technological systems 
where the broadened regime concept recognizes the agency of social groups and the role of rules 
as being a guiding factor. In a multi-level analysis, the regime is the point of primary focus since 
the defining feature of a transition is the shift from one regime to another, although it is difficult 
to demarcate when a shift has occurred as it depends on the timescale of the analysis. Nonetheless, 
the value of this mode of analysis, with its focal point at the regime, is that it allows the analyst to 
assess the socio-structural dynamics of transitions as opposed to looking to the technological end 
state (Verbong and Geels, 2010). Geels further specifies seven dimensions of the ST regime to 
help ground an understanding that can readily be applied: technology, user practices and 
application domains (markets), symbolic meaning of technology, infrastructure, industry structure, 
policy, and techno-scientific knowledge (Geels, 2004). A useful way to think about these 
dimensions is as nodes within the seamless web. And it is paramount that in a stable regime the 
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junctions that link these nodes together are aligned and co-ordinated in a mutually reinforcing way 
by the agency of the social actors and organizations that comprise the ST regime. The regime 
reinforces itself through the enactment of rules, by the agents and organizations, such as those that 
drive cognitive routines and maintain shared beliefs, lifestyles, and favourable institutional 
arrangements, to provide a few examples (Geels, 2004). Although stable ST regimes are stable 
precisely because the system is aligned and embedded, it does not mean that there is no ongoing 
innovative activity. Instead, the progression of innovation is gradual and incremental but following 
along what is called a technological trajectory, which Geels situates in the realm of the landscape 
level of the MLP model (Geels, 2002).  
Landscape: 
The landscape level can be understood as an external structure that represents the 
conditions of society. Other factors that are contained within the landscape include “demographical 
trends, political ideologies, societal values, macro-economic patterns,” and other exogenous 
pressures that influence the actions of societal actors and organizations (Geels, 2011). However, 
in my opinion, landscape factors are inchoate phenomena that need to interpreted by humans 
according to cognitive rules and made sense out of before they can exert any exogenous pressure 
on the regime. Take the example of climate change, where changes in weather patterns, species 
decline, and scientific data gathered from important biophysical landmarks on earth (e.g. article 
circles, rainforests, atmosphere, etc.) first had to be interpreted before humans were able to 
attribute these effects to anthropogenic causes, which only then prompted (read: exerted pressure 
on) societies to respond with sustainability-oriented initiatives and policies.  
Niche 
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Conversely, the type of disruptive innovation that one imagines challenges the ST regime, 
grows out of the niche level of the MLP model and when in the presence of points of tension, can 
become embedded in the ST regime (Geels, 2002; 2004). The niche level can be thought of as an 
incubation chamber where novelty is seeded and shielded from the selection criteria of the regime, 
which acts as a barrier to entry since the characteristics of niche developments (e.g. price, 
performance, etc.) are a mismatch for the regime. The niche level thus insulates or protects the 
development of innovation until such a time that it can reasonably break into or become embedded 
into the regime (Geels, 2002; 2004). Put otherwise, the niche is the realm of R&D and even small 
innovative firms that are testing out prototypical products and services and may even have a few 
select contracts with early adopters and a miniscule proportion of the market size. Although I will 
elaborate on the regime dynamics below and transitional pathways in Part III, it is worthy to note 
in the meantime that the successful integration of niche element into the regime is often facilitated, 
if not enabled, by downward pressures exerted from the landscape level that creates a “window of 
opportunity.” (Geels, 2002). 
 
2.2. Operationalizing the MLP: identifying Ontario’s electricity regime 
Above I have established that the niche level is encapsulated within the ST regime, which 
is in turn entombed within the ST landscape, with each successive layer being characterized by 
greater stability than the previous. All three tiers interact internally as well as with the other tiers. 
Below I will outline why it is so difficult for a novelty to forge its way into the regime level, which 
forms the backbone of transitions but first I will proceed to operationalize the MLP within the 
context of Ontario’s electricity sector by matching the elements of the MLP framework with the 
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legislative and institutional realities of Ontario. (i.e. the organization structure, supply chain, and 
infrastructure).  
Regime – Applied 
 The most important component of an MLP analysis is to identify the regime as it is the 
shift in a regime that determines the effect of a transition. Taking guidance from Verbong and 
Geels, the first step is for “the analyst [to] demarcate the empirical level of the object and then 
operationalize.” (Verbong and Geels, 2007).  When analyzing the electricity sector, as is the case 
here, there are several contenders for the object of analysis. For example, in their analysis of the 
Dutch electricity system, Verbong and Geels turn their attention towards the primary fuel because 
their transition is focused on fuel switching and types of generation (Verbong and Geels, 2007). 
Since in this paper, I am focusing on the integration of DERs, which by definition are embedded 
into the distribution system, then that is the object of my analysis. However, given the statutory 
framework of the electricity sector, I cannot analyze the distribution system in isolation and must 
turn my attention towards the larger system (i.e. the provincial grid) in which it is situated.  
Minister of Energy 
 Perhaps the most peculiar aspect of the electricity sector that a layperson would question 
is why is the role of the government and law so fundamentally important to the provision of a 
commodity that could otherwise be organized by a private sector supply chain? After all, despite 
being heavily regulated industries, securities exchanges, telecommunications, and commercial 
flying are all owned and operated by private entities. To understand this, the reader must first take 
a brief glance at the historical development of this public utility in Ontario. Shortly after 
understanding the potential economic and developmental potential that could be harnessed from 
exploiting hydropower in Niagara Falls, the powers that be created a public body tasked with the 
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construction of generation, transmission, and sale of electricity to municipal distributors (Nelles, 
1974). It was perceived that a public body could do this cheaper than profit maximizing private 
entities (Nelles,1974). This eventually led to the creation of Ontario Hydro, the provincially-owned 
vertically-integrated monopoly. Seen almost as arm of the government, Ontario Hydro was imbued 
with broad self-regulatory and price-setting powers (Nelles, 1974). Then in the last decade of the 
twentieth century, perceptions changed, influenced by neoliberal economics, and it was surmised 
that a competitive electricity market could service the province more efficiently than the monopoly 
behemoth that was Ontario Hydro (Trebilcock and Hrab, 2005). As the regulation of electricity 
constitutionally fits within the provincial heads of power, this paradigmatic change was 
implemented through an act of the provincial legislature that, although known as deregulation, 
could probably be more accurately characterized as reregulation because the result comprised of a 
significantly lengthier and more detailed statutory framework for the sector than was previously 
the case. The act thus replaced the Power Corporation Act that statutorily created Ontario Hydro 
and effectively implemented a corporate reorganization through the creation of new entities 
through new legislation (OPA, 2005). The Electricity Competition Act created the Electricity Act, 
1998 and amended the then-pithy Ontario Energy Board Act, 1998 (Clark, Stoll, and Cass, 2012). 
The former, most significantly, disaggregated Ontario Hydro into Ontario Power Generation, 
Hydro One Networks Inc., and the Independent Market Operator (IMO); these are the most 
relevant entities for the purposes of this paper. While the latter empowered the Board to oversee 
Ontario’s newly minted competitive wholesale and retail electricity markets (Clark, Stoll, and 
Cass, 2012).  
The idea behind this strategy was to effectively unbundle the provision of electricity, where 
at the wholesale level, generators would bid, clear, and get dispatched on a centrally optimized 
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provincial grid, and at the retail level, distributors would maintain their territorial monopolies and 
be tasked with the role of standard supply unless a third party retailer, participating on an open-
access grid, would contract to supply end-users under different offerings than those offered by the 
standard supply distributor; under this model, the role of the government was as truly minimal 
(OPA, 2005).  For reasons that I will not elaborate on in this paper, this model was quickly replaced 
by the subsequent government with the passing of the Electricity Restructuring Act, 2004. [For 
further reading see Winfield and MacWhirter, 2019.] The most significant change implemented 
through the ERA was the creation of the Ontario Power Authority and the renaming of the extant 
IMO to the Independent Electricity System Operator, which signaled a decreased reliance on 
market mechanisms (Clark, Stoll, and Cass, 2012). This shift also saw a vast increase in the role 
of the government in the electricity sector. I will spend the subsequent paragraphs elaborating on 
the entities mentioned here as they collectively comprise Ontario’s electricity regime, however, in 
the remainder of this paragraph I will explain the current statutory role of the Minister of Energy 
in the electricity sector.  
 The Minister of Energy currently possesses broad powers with respect to system 
infrastructure and supply mix planning, procurement, and regulatory decision-making. These 
statutory powers flow from Part II.2 of the current state of the Electricity Act as amended by the 
Energy Statute Law Amendment Act, 2016. With respect to system planning, the Minister is the 
lead planner through the Long-Term Energy Plan (LTEP), effectively taking over the role of the 
former Ontario Power Authority’s Integrated Power System Planning (IPSP) exercise (Vegh, 
2017). Section 25.29 prescribes that the Minister issue a plan every three years that addresses the 
cost effectiveness of supply and capacity, reliability and resiliency to the effects of climate change, 
conservation and demand management, use of cleaner and innovative energy sources, sector 
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emissions, and indigenous consultation. In undertaking this process, the Minister must consult the 
IESO’s technical report on the adequacy and reliability of the system and any changes to that 
forecast that may arise. Although at first glance, the LTEP may seem as merely a descriptive and 
aspirational policy document, section 25.30 reinforces the authority of the LTEP by enabling the 
Minister to compel the IESO and OEB to implement items contained in the LTEP that fall within 
their respective jurisdictions through the issuance of Ministerial Directives. Furthermore, section 
25.31 obliges the IESO and OEB to respond with implementation plans, outlining their intended 
approach to executing the LTEP items that the Minister, under subsection (5) can approve with or 
without changes, or reject and refer back for further consideration and resubmission. However, the 
subject matter of Ministerial Directives is not confined to items captured in the LTEP. Subsections 
25.32(2) and (5) enables the Minister to direct procurement - that is compel the IESO to solicit 
counterparties for offers or enter into contracts – for electricity supply, capacity, storage, measures 
related to the conservation and demand management, and matter related to the development of the 
transmission system. 
 
Independent Electricity System Operator (and merger with Ontario Power Authority) 
 The need for an independent system operator arose in Ontario with the commencement of 
restructuring through the Energy Competition Act. Previously, there was no need because the 
vertically-integrated Ontario Hydro exclusively operated the electricity system from generation to 
distribution, with limited and marginal departure for non-utility generators (Clark, Stoll, and Cass, 
2012). With the advent of a competitive wholesale market, the system required an independent 
and neutral entity to control access to the transmission network under an open-access policy, 
balance supply and demand through scheduling and dispatch from a plethora of independent 
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market participants, and oversee power flows for purposes of security and reliability. Furthermore, 
because Ontario’s competitive electricity market was designed as a centrally-optimized model 
(market design will be elaborated on in Part IV), meaning that an ISO forecasts demand and 
validates the viability of power flows in the face of the thermal and congestive constraints of the 
system, it was sensible to additionally task it with the role of the wholesale market administrator 
and financial clearinghouse, which accepts bids and offers, determines the wholesale price through 
an algorithm, and clears transactions (Clark, Stoll, and Cass, 2012). Thus Ontario’s Independent 
Electricity System Operator, was incorporated by statute as a non-share, and operated as a not-for-
profit, crown corporation. 
 Under section 6(1) of the current state of the Electricity Act, the objectives of the IESO 
(formerly, IMO) include: to direct the operation and maintain the reliability of the IESO-controlled 
grid (defined as the transmission network that transmitters have authorized the IESO to operate); 
establish and enforce standards relating to the reliability of the integrated power system (which 
expands the IESO-controlled grid to include generation assets and distribution networks as well); 
operate the IESO-administered markets established by the Market Rules (section 32 enables the 
IESO to make rules governing the IESO-controlled grid, electricity and ancillary services markets, 
and reliability); engage in the solicitation and procurement for grid services, engage in the 
settlement of transactions and payments made pursuant to the delivery of grid services (i.e. 
electricity supply, storage, capacity, transmission, conservation and demand management). The 
IESO also authorizes market participants, publishes system forecasts (18-month outlook), market 
information, and enforces the Market Rules through its Market Assessment and Compliance 
Division (MACD). However, under section 4, the IESO’s market operations and procurement and 
contracts management functions must be kept strictly separated.  
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 The mandate of the IESO was further expanded when it absorbed the former Ontario Power 
Authority and merged into one entity retaining the IESO name (Vegh, 2014). When the 
competitive wholesale market first opened in Ontario, the hope was that long term capacity 
planning would be driven by market forces (i.e. high spot market prices would induce investors to 
construct more power plants to turn an extra profit). However, the near immediate effect proved 
to be the opposite and the high and volatile prices caused the the government to respond by 
bringing the long-term system planning back within its power through the creation of the Ontario 
Power Authority, which was created with the Electricity Restructuring Act (Clark, Stoll, and Cass, 
2012). The OPA was supposed to create a twenty-year Integrated Power System Plan, revised 
every three years and informed by a Supply Mix Directive from the government (OPA, 2005). 
That said, the OPA’s planning functions has since been eschewed with even prior to its merger 
with the IESO and replaced by the LTEP, as described above (Vegh, 2017). The current objectives 
of the IESO that continue from the OPA include the following. The most significant one can be 
described as the role of a load serving entity (LSE), which is slightly modified given Ontario’s 
governance framework for the sector (Clark, Stoll, and Cass, 2012). Normally, the defining 
characteristic of an LSE is that it is responsible for securing and directly procuring adequate supply 
security for its customers, by entering into contracts as a credit-worthy counterparty. While the 
IESO forecasts demand, it must rely on the Minister’s guidance through the LTEP and Ministerial 
Directives before deciding how to act in response to changes in the needs of the system; although, 
it has the ability to directly enter into contracts, this may raise some issues given its market 
enforcement role and character as a neutral system operator (Vegh, 2016). Furthermore, the OPA 
was allowed to create a charge to collect from ratepayers to pay towards power procured through 
long-term contract called the Global Adjustment (GA), which continues to exists under the IESO’s 
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contract management activities (Clark, Stoll, and Cass, 2012). The IESO’s mandate is also 
embedded with certain policy objectives such as to actively engage in seeking opportunities to 
increase the use of clean and renewable technologies and collecting data derived from smart meters 
deployed in Ontario.  
 
Ontario Energy Board 
 With two rounds of industrial restructuring, the OEB went from being a limited 
independent reviewer of Ontario Hydro’s planned expenditures, to an economic regulator of 
competition, to now being a public policy regulator with the purpose of protecting consumers from 
the monopolistic effects of distributors (Clark, Stoll, and Cass, 2012). Currently, section 1 of the 
Ontario Energy Board Act sets out the objectives of the OEB to be the protection and education 
of consumers, promotion of economic and cost-efficiency, and facilitation of government policies 
such as the implementation of the smart grid, conservation and demand management, and 
promotion of renewable sources of generation through accommodation by system expansion and 
reinforcement. The OEB is also responsible for licensing industry participants (different from 
authorizing market participants) such as generators, transmitters, distributors, retailers, and even 
the IESO, and approving the construction of facilities (Clark, Stoll, and Cass, 2012). Similar to the 
IESO, the OEB has also has the power to issue rules, in the form of codes of conduct such as the 
Transmission, Distribution, and Retail Settlement Codes, respectively, as stated in section 70.1. 
The OEB also fulfills a role in relation to Ontario’s wholesale electricity market through the 
Market Surveillance Panel, which works in tandem with IESO’s MACD in order to assess the 
effects of the market design and attempt to improve or adjust it to meet certain objectives (Clark, 
Stoll, and Cass, 2012). With respect to this paper, however, the most important role of the OEB is 
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its rate and activity regulation of Local Distribution Companies (LDCs) and how in turn this 
decision making process is affected by Ministerial Directives to what is considered as industry 
evolution, as per section 2.1.  
In regards to the regulation to the regulation of LDCs, this will be elaborated on below, 
and in regards to Ministerial Directives to the OEB, the following can be said in the meantime. 
Section 2.1 of the OEB Act states that the OEB shall exercise its decision making power with a 
view to achieving the objectives of any Directive issued. This means that in any given context 
policy concerns such as giving preference to renewable technologies can outweigh the importance 
of cost-efficiency (Vegh, 2016). In Part III, I will elaborate how a Directive issued pursuant to the 
2017 LTEP is meant to initiate policy reform in the OEB’s decision making factors when it comes 
to allowing LDCs to rate-base certain investments and activities in order to promote and encourage 
innovation in the distribution sector.  
Distribution Segment - Local Distribution Companies 
 Prior to restructuring, municipal electric utilities (MEU) owned, operated, and maintained 
the many distribution systems across Ontario, totaling over 300 MEUs spanning across the 
province’s Local Distribution Areas (LDAs) (King, 2016). With restructuring, although the 
distribution of electricity was unbundled from vertical activities such as generation and 
transmission, it continued to be deemed a natural monopoly - likely due to the redundancy of 
duplicating poles-and-wires – and continues to be granted a territorial monopoly. However, since 
MEUs were made to incorporate under the Ontario Business Corporations Act, retaining the 
respective municipalities as the sole shareholders in most cases, subsequent merger activity across 
the sector now leaves the number of LDCs hovering around seventy (Clark, Stoll, and Cass, 2012). 
Ontario’s LDCs are in contrast with the above, not statutory actors, rather they are rate and activity 
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regulated corporations that develop the distributions system, connect customers, and control access 
to the distribution grid, under a non-discriminatory policy (King, 2016). Furthermore, in contrast 
with many investor-owned utilities in other jurisdictions such as the United States, for example, 
LDCs are not load-serving entities and consequently more closely resemble a “mere passer-by” 
business model tasked with purchasing supply on the wholesale market and ensuring the one-way 
power flow from the bulk transmission system to end-use consumers, with limited instances of 
embedded generation through MicroFIT and Net Metering programs; as stated above in Ontario 
the LSE role is role shared between the IESO and Minister of Energy. As the niche section below 
will reveal, this normative role is beginning to be challenged in Ontario.  
Moving on, with respect to rate-regulation, the OEB sets the pricing structure for the 
distributors’ customers, and in doing so allows the LDCs to earn a reasonable return on approved 
capital investments made into the system; this is consistent with the OEB’s objective under s. 1(1) 
of the OEB Act, which is to “facilitate the maintenance of a financially viable electricity industry.” 
With respect to the regulation of business activity, under section 70.1, a condition of every section 
57 license is compliance with the provisions (and restrictions) set out in the OEB Act and any codes 
issued pursuant to it such as the Distribution System Code, Retail Settlement Code, Affiliate 
Relationship Code, and Standard Supply Service Code, as well as the IESO Market Rules. By 
extension this means that the LDCs are also indirectly tasked with supporting the implementation 
of the government’s policy objectives for the sector such as deploying smart grid technologies, 
encouraging renewable generation, and carrying out conservation and demand management 
initiatives. Specific restrictions on business activities for LDCs include retailing electricity, which 
is circumvented through the affiliate form, generation, and cross-subsidization of affiliate activities 
through the rate-base. Thus, as this paper will explore in significantly more detail, the evolution 
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of the distribution industry relies greatly on the regulatory framework that is decided by policy 
makers. 
Landscape – Applied 
Recall that landscape is the trajectory formulated by the implications of long-term trends 
that are inchoate until human actors become cognizant of them and are influenced by these 
exogenous factors, with the most obvious example being the phenomenon of climate change and 
the subsequent response by policy makers through law such as Ontario’s Climate Change Action 
Plan. Since my object of analysis is the regulatory framework for a decentralized power system, 
then it is logical to assert that observed industry trends implicitly reveal the landscape factors that 
drive the development and trajectory of the evolutions of the industry. 
The industry trends to a great extent are driven by consumer trends, not only in the 
electricity industry through consumption patterns but also in other industries as those influence 
consumer expectations of their service providers, which carry over from one industry to another. 
In essence, as this paper will illustrate, consumers begin to expect their electricity suppliers to treat 
them like their telecommunications suppliers where the consumer has choices for packages based 
on its needs, etc. Speaking this point, I have attended several industry conferences, mainly the 
“Leading the Charge” conference that took place at Ryerson University and the Center for Urban 
Energy in June 2018, the “Future of Energy: Taking the Digital Leap” conference that took place 
at MaRS Discovery District in March 2018, and the IESO’s annual Electricity Summit that took 
place in June 2018. A common way of capturing the aggregate of the consumer trends that was 
commonly referred to among all of these conference was by referring them as the “five D’s:” 
decarbonisation, digitization, decentralization, deregulation, and democratization. The following 
is based on my notes from the presenters, panelists, and discussions had at these conferences; these 
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themes are also explored in the MIT Utility of the Future report (and the five D’s are sometimes 
referred to as three or four D’s as they get bundled in different ways). 
The first phenomenon, decarbonization refers to the increasing integration and shifting of 
fuel sources for electricity generation from non-renewables to renewable or at least non-emitting 
resources (i.e. nuclear) with the objective of achieving grid parity and even overtaking the 
dominant position occupied by fossil fuelled generation. However, these shifts are challenging 
planning and operational aspects of the grid as most renewable generating sources are intermittent 
and must be balanced appropriately through mechanisms such as storage to avoid the need to 
supplement them with traditional fossil fuels (More Than Smart, 2017; MIT, 2016).  
Digitization refers to the proliferation, drastic price decreases, and increased accessibility 
of Information Communication Technologies (ICT) that enable connectivity and interoperability 
across the grid infrastructure through the Internet of Things (IoT) (MIT, 2016). This technology is 
seen as the linchpin of the “Smart Grid,” due to the fact that it allows energy resources and other 
grid assets to gather data, compute analytics, respond to dispatch signals, and be controlled 
remotely.  
Decentralization refers to the observed trend of the distribution grid becoming increasingly 
active in enabling and facilitating bi-directional power flows rather than simply being a flow-
through for transmission-connected generation to loads and end-users (More Than Smart, 2017). 
This is occurring through increased connectivity of embedded resources such as (rooftop) solar 
PV for generation or batteries for storage both behind-the-meter and in-front. This enables 
generation as well as reliability services such as reactive power to flow and be delivered within 
distribution grid from resources other than the transmission-distribution transformer node 
connected to the distribution grid to be transmitted to other loads with decreased reliance on the 
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bulk level (however, not quite at the level of a microgrid that can be islanded). Previously behind-
the-meter connections were encouraged by the MicroFIT and Net Metering programs in Ontario, 
however, have since been picked up by utility companies to develop in-front-of-meter assets for 
reliability purposes. This paper will show that a decentralized grid has significant potential for 
increasing resiliency among other benefits within distribution grids.  
Deregulation can often refer to two things. First, an older development of some two 
decades now, is the Electricity Act, 1998, which restructured Ontario’s electricity sector from a 
government owned and operated, vertically-integrated, monopoly known as Ontario Hydro into a 
supply chain that more closely resembles a free market by unbundling generation and opening it 
up to private power producers to offer their bids through a centrally-optimized spot market (also 
this has since changed) as well as the construction and ownership of transmission lines. Second, 
deregulation may also refer to recent decisions issued by the Ontario Energy Board, in which they 
decline to pull into their regulatory purview behind-the-meter assets (and electric vehicle charging 
infrastructure) opening the door for many opportunities as will be described later in this paper, 
such as private third party businesses to foray into innovative commercial relationships and the 
potential to provide services to the grid in addition to the benefits only keeping to the site-host 
(Stevens, 2016).  
Finally, Democratization refers to observation that all of the factors mentioned above are 
having the effect of providing consumers with previously unavailable optionality in setting up their 
energy supply and consumption needs and patterns. This is because previously, and dominantly 
still, the model (in Ontario) is that consumers are billed by the (retail affiliate) of their Local 
Distirbution Company on a one-size-fits-all pricing structure. Additionally, sources of generation 
decided on the wholesale level and effectively the only choice a consumer has is through the 
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political process, by voting for a party with a clear issue and commitment to implementing a clear 
resolution that resonates with the consumer. Although there was limited relief following the 
breakout of the competitive retail market that offered limited benefits by hedging price volatility 
by offering customers a fixed price and even clean generation, this has not actualized as ideally 
and shortly burned out. 
Niche – Applied 
Recall that the niche is the cradle of radical innovation, that is developments in activities 
such as technological research and development and innovative business models that do not 
necessarily conform to the selection criteria – or rules – of the regime and therefore are not aligned 
with its actors. One example that fits this description that I turn to as a proxy to analyze the niche 
in Ontario is the Electricity Distributors Association’s (EDA) “Power to Connect” Vision Paper 
and Roadmap. The EDA is a trade organization that represents and advocates for the interests of 
its constituent members being most of the LDCs across Ontario. The Vision Paper is premised on 
the recognition that the electricity system is undergoing significant change, specifically citing the 
landscape factors mentioned above and citing the OEB’s comments on the changing role of LDC 
to the effect of shifting from a mere “delivery route for power from grid to consumers” to a “service 
platform offering services such as balancing, power quality, storage, and redistributing power from 
users connected to their systems.” (EDA, 2017) Unsurprisingly, the EDA considers the LDCs for 
various reasons to be the best positioned to take on the leading role in facilitating the transition to 
a decentralized power system, recognizing however, that it requires a shift in the regulatory 
framework and change from other actors such as the OEB, IESO, and MOE (EDA, 2017). Thus in 
this forward-looking paper, the EDA exposits a comprehensive concept for the future role and 
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business model that LDCs must gradually transition into, called the Fully Integrated Network 
Orchestrator (FINO) (EDA, 2017). 
The FINO concept, as envisioned by the EDA, revolves around three main functional 
elements: a DER enabling platform, DER integration, and DER control and operation (EDA, 
2017). With respect to the first component, the DER enabling platform means the “extent to which 
LDCs will provide an intelligent platform where DER third party providers and customers plug-
n’-play” and where the central concern of the LDC will be to “ensure that the distribution network 
can accommodate DER connections, while maintaining the stability and reliability of the grid.” 
(EDA, 2017). To unpack this somewhat, it is useful to consider some of the enabling technologies 
and operational processes that are needed to make this possible. A few examples include: 
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), which are “microprocessor-based controllers of power 
system equipment that can also make two-way digital communication possible with other 
devices;” smart inverter technologies that permit generation management; and Advanced 
Distribution Management Systems (ADMS), which provide “a single, more efficiently managed 
platform for operating the distribution network” through “unified operational and engineering 
data.” (EDA, 2017). Thus these technologies, also known as ICTs and IOTs as mentioned in the 
landscape factors, provide the base capabilities for the DER enabling platform, which is intended 
to “provide a transport for grid intelligence and enable management and automation of two-way 
power flows, transactive energy markets, and other energy services.” (EDA, 2017). 
With respect to the second component, DER integration means “the degree of DER asset 
ownership by LDCs in their scope of business.” (EDA, 2017). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the report 
supports LDC ownership of DER, a point that I will contest in detail in Part IV, claiming that they 
are uniquely positioned to take on these investments because they can potentially earn immediate 
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returns on the assets through permissive rate regulation where in contrast private companies cannot 
access this benefit. Conversely, LDCs may leverage their knowledge of their systems to contract 
these services out to customers or third party developers, potentially facilitating the development 
of new energy solutions, idea, and services (EDA, 2017). This is commonly referred to as Non-
Wires Solutions (NWS) that will be explored in further detail in Part III and does not necessarily 
entail ownership of the DER assets. However, lending further support for LDC ownership of DER 
assets, the report points to Alectra’s (PowerStream at the time the report was written and since 
then merged with Alectra under the latter’s name) deployed POWER.HOUSE project, which “uses 
a fleet of [customer-sited] Solar PVs and energy storage systems to form a virtual power plant that 
can be controlled to simulate a single, larger power generating facility.” (EDA, 2017). I will further 
elaborate on the POWER.HOUSE pilot project in Part III. 
With respect to the second component, DER control and operation means “the degree to 
which LDCs control and operate DER assets that are connected to their distribution networks.” 
(EDA, 2017). Effectively, this role entails that the LDC “serve as a distribution system operator 
[DSO] or a mini-IESO” in order to “optimize the value of DERs to the larger system and to all 
customers” through operations such as “real-time visibility, DER price signaling, and [the use of] 
new products and services such as virtual power plant aggregation, load management, and grid 
services”; these functions rely on the capabilities afforded by DER Management System (DERMS) 
technologies that enable “network visibility, asset monitoring and control, scheduling and 
dispatch”, among other functions (EDA, 2017). The proper functioning of this role inextricably 
relies on the ability to send appropriate price signals “so that investments behind-the-meter are 
economic for both the customers and the entire system.” (EDA, 2017). Additionally, for this role 
to function effectively, it is imperative that LDCs are able to coordinate operations with the IESO. 
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The report also refers to Alectra’s POWER.HOUSE as a proof of concept for the operation of an 
aggregated virtual power plants operated through the use of a DERMS. In Part IV, I will return to 
the concept of a DSO and elaborate in further details on the variants of this model and their 
associated issues and solutions. 
 
2.3. Stability and Dynamics of Regime Transitions: Ontario context 
Given that socio-technical regimes are characterized by self-reinforcing stability, how then 
do transitions occur? The answer is provided by the literature: “It is the alignment of developments 
(successful processes within the niche reinforced by changes at regime level and at the level of the 
sociotechnical landscape) which determine if a regime shift will occur.” (Geels, 2004). A transition 
is effectively a shift from one regime to another. Despite stability that characterizes regimes, there 
are at best semi-coherent rules that can conflict depending on shifting factors and cause tensions 
(Geels, 2005). That said, it still remains to be discussed how these developments come about. Not 
only is it dependent on niche developments but on regime dynamics as well and landscape factors 
when interpreted and acted upon they exert downward pressures onto the regime, dissolving 
linkages between regime elements due to shifting paths and coordination that must be reconciled 
in light of the new factors, giving the opportunity for niche developments to overcome the barriers 
that may have pervaded earlier (Geels, 2005). I will address this point by mentioning the 
mechanism of niche-cumulation and the prevalence of tensions within the ST regime.  
Recall, socio-technical regimes develop along a trajectory as time goes on. This trajectory 
is defined by the alignment and coordination of the social actors, groups, organizations, and rules 
that make up the ST regime (Geels, 2005). This is because the agents operating within the regime, 
previously considered the engineers who produce technical systems but then expanded to consider 
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a wider array of social actors and organizations, reproduce the rules as they enact them in routine 
behaviours (Geels, 2004). This is in turn creates deep grooves of path dependency (Geels, 2004). 
They also rely on the stability of the regime and thus design the trajectory in such a way that it is 
based on the current rules and thus the trajectories never depart too much from the existing regime. 
The trajectory and rules of the regime thus create many elements of the selection environment (e.g. 
no supporting infrastructure, mismatch of rules and user practices, barriers to entry, market will 
not support price or performance), which explains why it is so difficult for novelty to enter and be 
retained within the regime. Not only does radical innovation (I use the term to refer to innovation 
that occurs outside of the regime) need to develop supply chains, maintenance networks, and 
ensure compliance with existing regulations, but they also need to co-evolve with a market that 
does not necessarily exist yet (Geels, 2002). Additionally, it needs to gain market traction, which 
relies on the willingness of users to learn and adapt to interacting with the innovation. As a result, 
regimes rarely if ever experience an internal overhaul and rely on upwards pressure by niche-
cumulation and downwards landscape pressures. When these pressures are aligned they create 
tensions within the regime, which create space for new nodes and linkages within the network of 
the regime that can cause a ripple effect and the emergence of a realigned regime (Geels, 2004). 
Niche-cumulation occurs when niches are increasingly used in “subsequent application domains.” 
(Geels, 2002). In other words, it is the process of widespread acceptance and integration into user 
practices and other elements of the regime (e.g. new product acquiring market share).  
There are three core processes that contribute to niche-cumulations (Geels, 2011): (a) the 
adjustment of expectation and visions which provide guidance to innovation activities and aim to 
attract attention and funding from external actors; (b) the building of social networks and 
enrolment of more actors which expand the resource base and; (c) the learning and articulation on 
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various dimensions such as technological design, market demand, user preferences, infrastructure 
requirements, organizational issues, business models, policy instruments, symbolic meaning 
(Geels, 2011). These mutually reinforcing processes create intertia (internal momentum) that help 
the niche develop closer to the selection criteria but are also aided by destabilization being altered 
within the regime by observation of the niche but also by the downward pressures of the landscape 
until there is a match or potential for a match seem to become more likely (Geels, 2011). 
Stability and Niche-Cumulation in Ontario 
 Given that Ontario’s statutory framework sets out the network of actors that comprise the 
electricity sector and their respective roles, formal rules in the form of statutes, regulations, and 
other forms of delegated rules such the OEB’s various codes of conduct and the IESO’s Market 
Rules play a determinative role in both providing stability as well as enabling transitions. This is 
especially true in the case of a transition to a decentralized power system. For example, since DERs 
are connected at the distribution level of the grid, the viability of their connection is subject to the 
OEB’s Distribution System Code (DSC) and any other rule that may compel, prohibit, or give 
discretion to the LDC with regard to connecting a given DER. That said, most customer-installed 
DERs such as residential rooftop solar PV circumvent this obstacle by connecting behind-the-
meter for (partial) self-generation, which is not subject to regulation by the OEB. However, until 
the passing of the Green Energy and Green Economy Act, 2009, all costs and benefits associated 
with the adoption of behind-the-meter generating systems were confined to the site host. This 
means that electricity generated by the system could only be consumed on site and could not be 
injected into the grid or conveyed to another load if it relied on the grid for its delivery. With the 
GEA and subsequent developments, embedded generation could be conveyed into the grid on a 
remunerative basis through the MicroFIT and Net Metering programs, which were implemented 
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through the legislative process and created formal rules that capture these arrangements (Rivard 
and Yatchew, 2016).  
That said, the transition that is the focus of this paper, leading to the decentralization of the 
power system, requires much more fundamental change. With the exponential complication of 
assets connected to the distribution grid such as solar PV, energy storage, electric vehicles (EV) 
and EV charging infrastructure, not only do opportunities for transactive energy (delivering grid 
services from behind-the-meter generation) need to be greatly expanded, but changes in the 
operation of the grid must also be made and the rules need to change to reflect this new reality. As 
demonstrated above by the EDA Vision Paper, a decentralized power system will require at least 
a new layer of system operation at the distribution level, which the LDCs are poised to assume the 
role. However, they cannot make the transition unilaterally because there are regulatory 
restrictions on their business activities as well as rigorous reviews of their expenditures, especially 
for determining whether they can earn a rate of return on those expenditures. In MLP terms what 
this demonstrates is the prevalence of landscape factor exerting pressure on the regime (to better 
integrate DERs) while the niche is significantly undergoing the process of niche-cumulation.  
With regard to the former, the landscape factors exerting pressure on the regime for the 
better integration of DERs have already been detailed in the section above. However, with regard 
to the latter the process of niche-cumulation has been evidenced because the EDA Vision Paper 
and the projects referenced within it such as Alectra’s POWER.HOUSE demonstrate core 
processes (a) and (b) mentioned above where the FINO idea and by implication the transition 
towards a decentralized power system has articulated a vision that provides guidance on innovation 
activities and has attracted attention and funding (as per (a)); it has also build a network and 
enrolled actors to expand the resource baser (as pe (b)) (i.e. the EDA in drafting the report 
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consulted significantly with the members its advocates for, the LDCs of Ontario). With regard to 
core process (c), power system decentralization in Ontario does not demonstrate significant 
advancement, lacking specifically in market design, infrastructure requirements, and 
organizational issues and business models. In the next part of this paper, Part III, I will pick up 
particularly on these points as I assess Ontario’s grid modernization efforts and the intended path 
it seeks to take to move towards ta decentralized grid, further analyzing the interactions between 
the niche and the regime in Ontario’s unique statutory context for the electricity sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   46	  
PART III: ONTARIO’S GRID MODERNIZATION AS A 
SUSTAINABILITY TRANSITION 
 
 
3.1. Ontario’s Grid Modernization: the road that leads to DER 
 
In Part II, I examined the role of formal rules (i.e. legislation), and to a lesser extent the 
normative and cognitive rules that are reflected in the legislation, in setting out the parameters 
and guiding the coordination of activities of regime actors, which through repeated behaviours 
contribute to path dependency and stability but can conversely be a significant enabler of 
innovation when it interacts with niche developments. With regard to the niche in Ontario, I 
commented that it is undergoing through the process of niche-cumulation, which is the process 
of the niche breaking through to the regime, thus signifying a transition. That said, given 
Ontario’s unique statutory context (i.e. the nature and degree of industry regulations), I put 
forward that the process of niche-cumulation cannot be unilateral and depends to a great degree 
on the actions of regime actors, for example to create more permissive regulations. This is 
consistent with other criticisms of the MLP theory, which characterize the process of niche-
cumulation to be too “bottom-up” and thus ignoring some of the greater dynamics that occur 
between the regime and the niche rather and only narrowly focusing on developments within the 
niche (Geels, 2011). I echo these criticisms and thus refine my analysis accordingly to address 
these complexities. Thus, in this part I focus on analyzing Ontario’s grid modernization 
initiatives, that are predominantly driven by regime actors and contribute to those factors that I 
have identified as lacking in the process of niche-cumulation, which are market design, 
infrastructure requirements, and organizational issues and business models. Following my 
analysis of Ontario’s grid modernization initiatives, I will revisit the MLP literature with respect 
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to transitional pathways and comment on the implications of Ontario’s transitional pathway as 
well as its structural implications within the normative frame of a sustainability transition.  
 
Ontario’s 2017 Long-Term Energy Plan 
 In Part II, I identified the role of the Minister of Energy as the lead planner for the electricity 
system as well as having a role in directing the evolution of the industry and sector as its operates 
in Ontario. This role is fulfilled through the statutory power enshrined in section 25.29 of the 
Electricity Act, which mandates that every three years (per Ontario Regulation 355/17) the 
Minister of Energy release a Long-Term Energy Plan and that subsequently the IESO and OEB 
issue Implementation Plans in response to any Ministerial Directives directed to them that flow 
out of the LTEP. Ontario’s 2017 LTEP, entitled “Delivering Fairness and Choice” contains many 
initiatives related to grid modernization, however, for the purposes of this paper, I focus on the 
items, Implementations Directives, and their subsequent Implementation Plans that contribute to 
the integration of DERs and power system decentralization in Ontario, which are primarily 
captured in Chapter 3: Innovating to Meet the Future and Chapter 4: Improving Value and 
Performance for Consumers (MOE, 2017). 
 
OEB Implementation Directive and Plan 
The subject of the Implementation Directive issued to the OEB can be traced directly to 
Chapter 3 of the LTEP, which includes content related to modernizing the system, grid 
modernization, distributed energy resources, and barriers to innovation. The main goal of the 
Directive is “to accelerate modernization of Ontario’s electricity system to keep pace with 
anticipated technological change and new energy products and services for consumers” 
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recognizing that “[g]rid modernization along with distributed energy resources are identified 
throughout the LTEP as important vehicles for achieving consumer choice and control.” 
Specifically, with its role as the regulator and contributor to policy development, the OEB is called 
to create “an environment conducive to distributor investment in “innovative solutions that make 
their system[s] more efficient, reliable and cost-effective, and provide more consumer choice.” 
The LTEP gives the OEB the task to support the creation of this environment by examining and 
identifying steps for pursuing opportunities such as “cost-effective smart grid and non-wires 
solutions; active system management and customer participation; and energy efficiency measures 
on distribution systems.” Alongside these tasks, “the OEB shall consider the issue of the diffusion 
of benefits that may arise from these and other distribution-system investments” and “assess 
market opportunities and facilitate those that would reduce costs and provide value for customers, 
and identify barriers to the development of distributed energy resources, such as energy storage, 
at scales and locations that provide value to customers and the bulk and local distribution systems.”  
In response, the OEB’s scope of work planned indicates that it will engage in “policy 
initiatives to advance regulatory processes in support of cost-effective grid modernization and 
reduce barriers to the development of distributed energy resources.” Furthermore, “in carrying out 
this work, the OEB expects to explore issues… such as diffuse benefit, and the potential for 
distributors to look to alternative, non-traditional distribution solutions when assessing options for 
addressing emerging system needs.” It will also look to “identify action items and regulatory 
priorities to be considered by the OEB that can encourage greater innovation by regulated utilities.” 
These points are included in items 1.2 and 1.3 of the Implementation Plan entitled, Cost-Effective 
Modernization and Distributed Energy Resources, respectively. 
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With respect to LTEP item 1.2, the OEB’s work plan, The way Forward for Adaptive 
Regulation, seeks to assess whether more holistic regulatory reforms are warranted in Ontario and 
how they might further enhance efficiency and innovation in the energy sector. It suggests to look 
to regulators in other jurisdictions that are considering new approaches to remunerating utilities to 
either supplement or replace the conventional rate-base rate-of-return approach. These include 
ways of treating traditional capital investments relative to non-capital expenditures that might 
better encourage the adoption of innovative and least-cost solutions and others that can entail 
forecasting the evolution of network uses and estimating efficient system expenditures, improving 
efficiency incentives, and ensuring appropriate sharing of risk. This would result in new ways of 
setting rates and determining allowable revenues for LDCs that optimize their investment and 
expenditure portfolios while encouraging LDCs to take advantage of new technology, potentially 
securing cost-effective benefits for customers in the process. The comprehensive approach to 
develop reforms includes consideration of non-wires solutions; operational measures to defer 
capital; active system management and customer participation; and energy efficiency measures on 
distribution systems (OEB, 2018).  
With respect to LTEP Item 1.3, the OEB’s work plan, Enabling Distributed Energy 
Resources, seeks to examine alternative way to encourage the efficient placement and operation 
of DERs, particularly when DERs can supplant traditional distribution system investments, while 
still ensuring that solutions with greatest long-term value are implemented. The scope of this work 
will include analyzing both DERs that are installed specifically to provide electricity services and 
those that primarily serve another function but can be aggregated to provide system benefits. The 
result is expected to be a compensation framework that enabled innovative investments to move 
forward when it is economic to do so.  The OEB plans to identify opportunities for regulatory 
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reform by considering frameworks for assessing and allocating the benefits and costs of DER 
investments; how to encourage DER deployment and operation that provide incremental value to 
consumers and the system, including distinct characteristics of storage; how diffuse benefits and 
multiple value streams can be appropriately recognized, taking into account seams between 
wholesale and retail markets; and the role of distributors and other solution providers, including 
the potential for customer involvement (OEB, 2018).  
In executing its Implementation Plan, the OEB notes that it must respect its statutory 
mandates which are to promote economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the electricity sector, 
as well as, the promotion of conservation and demand management (CDM), the use of renewable 
generation, and facilitating implementation of a smart grid. Thus its approach to grid 
modernization and DERs must demonstrably strike a balance within those parameters – between 
the potential to deliver value to consumers and avoiding significant cost consequences. As the 
OEB notes, this appropriate balance calls for a strategic approach targeting investments that cost-
effectively advance goals such as customer participation, choice and control, de-carbonization, and 
system resiliency. Where investments may deliver multiple value streams and diffuse benefits, the 
OEB is to consider how best to ensure that the value and benefits are appropriately measured and 
compensated, and that associated costs are fairly allocated. That said, the timeline for these 
initiatives spans for several years into the future, with the resulting actions not meant to come into 
effect until 2020 (OEB, 2018). 
IESO Implementation Directive and Plan 
 The IESO plays an important role in enabling innovation through “the information it 
provides, funding and programs it offers, and market-based opportunities it facilitates.” (IESO, 
2018). In its Implementation Plan, the IESO identifies two initiatives related to the integration of 
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DER. The first is to “develop a program to support a select number of innovative renewable 
distributed generation demonstration projects in order to gain direct experiences with integration 
of DERs, refine methodologies for assessing value streams, and to inform the evolution of grid 
systems, processes, and practices.” The intention is to “demonstrate opportunities to enhance 
integration into electricity system operations, planning, markets, and regulations.” Virtual Net 
Metering (VNM) has been identified as the topic for pilot project demonstrations. Under the VNM 
arrangement “customers are billed on a net-metered basis for eligible electricity generated from a 
facility that is not connected directly to the customer. The second initiative in the Implementation 
Plan is to “identify potential obstacles to fair competition for energy storage with other 
technologies in the delivery of services… through a review of the market rules, industry codes, 
and regulations… and, where appropriate, propose mitigation strategies… within the current 
structure of the market.” (IESO, 2018). That said, I will analyze the collective effects of these 
initiatives in the last section of this part, following an explanation of the transitional pathways 
contemplated by the transitional literature to better ground an analysis of the structural implications 
of Ontario’s planned approach to grid modernization. 
 
3.2. Revisiting Geels: Typology of Transitional Pathways  
 
The transitions literature, in addition to structurally conceptualizing how regimes change 
over time, goes further to detail the possibilities of transitional pathways that emerge based on the 
nature and timing of the interactions between the regime, landscape, and niche levels (Geels, 
2007). The timing and nature of interactions act determine the type of transition pathway because 
on one hand the landscape pressures can be either disruptive or reinforcing and on the other hand 
the niche level, although competitive with the regime it aims to replace, can also be symbiotic with 
the regime (Geels, 2007). The previous is meant to refer to the nature of interaction while timing 
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is meant to refer to the “maturity” of the niche. This means that the niche must demonstrate 
significant progress in the core processes of niche-cumulation as mentioned in Part II to become 
embedded into the regime. This occurs as niche innovations build up internal momentum through 
learning processes, price and performance increases and support from powerful groups (Geels, 
2007). Consequently, the four dominant transition pathways are (Geels, 2007, 2016):  
transformation: This occurs where there is downward landscape pressure but the niche is 
not adequately developed. This triggers gradual cumulative adjustments within the coordination 
of activities between regime actors implemented from within the regime. Effectively, the regime 
adjusts its own trajectory by making internal modifications of incremental changes to key elements 
of the regime mentioned in Part II. Although primarily driven from within, the regime actors may 
also adopt radical niche innovations and strategic direction that can trigger further adjustments 
such as organizational capacity, however in a limited capacity. 
De-alignment/Re-alignment: This occurs where there is a shock introduced by the 
landscape pressures but with an “avalanche effect.” This means that the direction is uncertain and 
regime actors are uncertain about “which dimensions to optimize.” Since the niche is not 
adequately developed in this situation either, a vacuum is created where several embryonic niches 
compete until one becomes dominant and a new regime is created around it. The distinguishing 
factor about this pathway is the temporal separation of entrant niches and its usual involvement of 
a major paradigm shift (that can often involve a societal crisis). 
Technological Substitution: This occurs where a disruptive niche innovation develops fully 
but separately of the regime and then breaks through in response to a specific shock when it arises. 
There is an adaptation process that occurs on a “fit-and-conform” or “stretch-and-transform” basis. 
This refers to how the niche adapts to the selection criteria of the regime. Radical innovations may 
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be developed and deployed by regime outsiders with normative motivations or by regime actors 
that diversify from other sectors. 
Reconfiguration: This occurs where a niche starts off as a symbiotic innovation that is 
adopted by the regime to solve local problems and subsequently begins to trigger further changes 
throughout the regime. The presence of landscape pressure is intermittent and can involve 
alliances between regime actors and new entrants due to a lack of capacity or other constraining 
factors such as anti-competitive concerns on part of the regime actors; this type of transition can 
be though of as modular. 
These pathways are described as alternatives to the default trajectory created by the 
default or business-as-usual actions of regime actors, which reproduce the established and 
entrenched routines that have the tendency to blind regime actors to factors outside of their focus 
(Geels, 2007). The transitions literature also discusses the possibility of jumps between pathways 
in a given transition, as noted by Geels: “Transitions may start along transformation via technical 
add-on and subsequently morph into a reconfiguration pathway as the new technology has wider 
effects that trigger innovation cascades and learning processes that change actors’ views and 
facilitate wider adjustments and increased adoption.” (Geels, 2007; 2016). However, this a two-
way streak where the regime in more disruptive paths may start to reject niche developments and 
regain stability, usually in the presence of reduced landscape pressures. This scenario may start 
as substitution where new entrants challenge regime actors but subsequently morph into 
transformation if establish and entrenched firms buy up small firms to control radical innovation. 
 
 
3.3. Ontario’s Transition as Transformation Pathway  
 
Non-Wires Solutions and Alectra POWER.HOUSE as Ontario’s Approach to DERs  
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When assessing Ontario’s grid modernization initiatives collectively, what most 
prominently emerges as the primary focus of this policy evolution is the desire to adjust the 
regulatory framework to enable LDCs to deployed Non-Wires Solutions (NWS). NWS is, as 
Navigant defines it, “an electricity grid investment or project that uses non-traditional distribution 
solutions, such as distributed generation, energy storage, energy efficiency, demand response, and 
grid software and controls to defer or replace the need for specific equipment upgrades such as 
lines or transformers, by reducing load at a substation.” (Navigant Consulting, 2018). NWS is also 
recognized as a process that facilitates the deployment of DERs and thus is an important 
component in any transition towards decentralization. The basic idea behind NWS is that it is an 
alternative solution to traditional infrastructure investments - the need for which arises most 
commonly as a result of aging infrastructure or load growth – at a potentially lower costs, shorter 
installation timeline, higher customer engagement, and increased environmental benefit (Navigant 
Consulting, 2018). NWS has the effect of addressing the local constraint or reliability issue by 
deploying a strategically-sited DER that produces a net load reduction in a load pocket that is 
downstream from the transmission or distribution constraint. In implementing a NWS project, the 
utility may offer “targeted and focused customer incentives and drive a marketing campaign to 
drive faster adoption of demand-reducing technology and utility-funded DERs.” (Navigant 
Consulting, 2018). However, the issue with the regulatory framework, in terms of both restrictions 
on business activity and rate-setting is that there is an established type of capital investments that 
LDCs are allowed to earn a regulated on, which NWS may not conform to, perhaps because its 
benefits cannot yet be demonstrated to have system-wide benefits that justify its expenditure 
(EDA, 2017). This regulatory uncertainty disincentives LDCs from procuring NWS even though 
they may be cheaper, more beneficial, and engage customers (EDA, 2017).  
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As an illustration of this concept and a demonstrated example of NWS deployed in Ontario, 
I turn to Alectra’s POWER.HOUSE (APH) pilot project mentioned in Part II. APH is a deployed 
fleet of 20 participating residential solar and storage resources that are aggregated through an 
intelligent software into a Virtual Power Plant (VPP), which has the effect of creating the 
functional equivalent of a single, larger resource (Alectra Utilities, 2017). The APH project is a 
collaboration between Alectra and the IESO, among other private entities, and funded by the 
IESO’s Conservation Fund in order to evaluate the costs and benefits of integrating DERs (Alectra 
Utilities, 2017). The aim of the feasibility study was to optimize the system and assess value 
streams and revenues generated from benefits flowing to numerous groups (Alectra Utilities, 
2017). To the customer, the behind-the-meter benefits included solar generation to offset the 
consumption of on-peak grid sourced energy, net metering, price arbitrage against time-of-use 
(TOU) pricing using storage capacity charged off-peak, and on-site back-up for unexpected 
outages (Alectra Utilities, 2017). To the utility, benefits included participation in markets for grid 
services such as voltage and frequency regulation, demand response, and operating reserve; the 
study also contemplated the potential for a flexible ramping product (Alectra Utilities, 2017). To 
the system, benefits include the deferral of infrastructure investment and the avoidance of 
greenhouse gas emissions (Alectra Utilities, 2017). The results of study indicate the potential to 
expand the PH fleet to 30,000 homes by 2031, establishing 140 MW of “local dependable 
capacity,” a measure that deducts the constraints of the system from the nameplate capacity 
(Alectra Utilities, 2017). Now that I have illustrated the LDC-deployed NWS model that comprises 
Ontario’s grid modernization and, by extension, sustainability transition, I will comment on the 
structural implications of this approach in terms of Geels’ typology of transitional pathways. 
Ontario’s Transformation Pathway 
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 In this section, I will demonstrate why Ontario’s approach to grid modernization, as 
evidenced by the 2017 LTEP and subsequent Implementation Plans issued by the OEB and IESO 
most closely resembles a transformation pathway with the potential to morph into a 
reconfiguration pathway. Recall, that the defining characteristic of a transformation pathway is 
that the transition is predominantly driven by established regime actors in response to landscape 
pressures when the niche is not adequately developed. Recall, also, that in Part II, after expositing 
what rules and actors comprise Ontario’s electricity regime and niche, I elaborated that the niche 
is not yet fully developed because although it demonstrates progress in the core processes of niche-
cumulation, it lacks development with respect to market design, infrastructure requirements, and 
organizational issues and business models. Furthermore, I have also explained why the 
development of these aspects of the core processes of niche-cumulation cannot be achieved 
through the bottom-up process of niche-cumulation. The reasons for this being that in order to 
develop these core processes, DERs must be widely deployed and studied, at least as pilot projects, 
in order to refine the methodology and framework of how to better integrate them, which cannot 
happen in the presence of restrictive and unclear regulations because of the nature and stringency 
of these regulations to the industry actors.  
I will spend this section detailing why the core processes of niche-cumulation depend on 
the activities of regime-level actors. For example, with respect to market design, the IESO is 
responsible for administering Ontario’s wholesale market, meaning that market design is within 
its purview. This is consistent with its Market Assessment and Compliance Division, which it 
houses and works together with the OEB’s Market Surveillance Panel to progressively make 
changes and improve the Market Rules and market design. The IESO’s Implementation Plan 
mentioned above, specifically the distributed renewable generation demonstration projects and 
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Virtual Net Metering pilots would have contributed to this end. However, this implementation item 
was prematurely cancelled because it depended on the adoption of updated regulations that would 
enable virtual net metering, which were rejected by a subsequent government from the one that 
introduced the change (Stevens, 2018). That said, IESO is undergoing a much larger overhaul 
known as Market Renewal, which is not directly aimed at integrating DERs, but may nonetheless 
have some impact on them; Market Renewal will be explored in further detail in Part IV. With 
respect to infrastructure requirements, this can pertain to both physical infrastructure, as well as 
economic, such as price signalling, and is tied in with market design and thus cannot develop on 
the niche level. With respect to organizational issues and business models, this ties in directly with 
the future role and activities of Ontario’s LDCs. This may also tie in with infrastructure 
requirements, since the operational structure of the grid may change if LDCs transition to a FINO 
role as contemplated by the EDA Vision Paper and gain visibility and dispatch control into their 
respective distribution grids, more closely resembling the role of the IESO; these ideas will be 
explored in further detail in Part IV. That said, the EDA Vision Paper also indicates that there are 
significant obstacles to the LDCs own transitional path to adapt to a decentralized grid as it isolates 
and makes recommendations as the restrictive and unclear regulations that are on one hand 
important, given the territorial monopolies granted to LDCs, but on the other hand reinforce 
stability and by extension a business-as-usual scenario (EDA, 2017); these recommendations will 
be explored further in Part IV. 
Now that I have supported my claim that niche-cumulation cannot develop significantly 
enough to break into the regime on its own, I will explain how Ontario’s grid modernization 
initiatives address some of these points and thus contribute to a transformation pathway. Above I 
have noted the emergence of a shift towards a LDC-deployed NWS model and pointed to Alectra’s 
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POWER.HOUSE project as an example. The main reason that I put forward that Ontario’s 
approach is a transformation pathway is because the changes being implemented, mainly through 
the legislative and regulatory processes and policy tools that change the formal and by extension 
normative rules that govern regime actors and coordinate the activities among them is being 
implemented from within the regime. That said, this mechanism for implementing is a necessity 
given Ontario’s statutory framework for the electricity sector. However, what reinforces my 
position, is the contemplated result of these changes, which is that expanding the business activity 
of LDCs and adjusting the regulatory framework for rate-setting, thereby enabling LDCs to deploy 
DERs vis-à-vis NWS, they remain the dominant actors with respect to the deployment of DER. 
Thus what results, if this transition unfolds as designed by the changes then in structural terms, the 
regime continues to be dominated by its established and entrenched actors, with limited adoption 
from the niche. In this sense, I use the term niche to refer to innovative firms who may be deploying 
DERs behind-the-meter for customers. The limited adoption of the niche may come in the form of 
LDCs contracting with third party developers to use their assets, deployed perhaps in front of the 
meter, to solve local constraints. This can be contrasted with a competitive retail market where 
third party DER developers may be offering their equipment and other benefits directly to 
customers of LDCs. However, there is little incentive for third party retailers to participate in a 
regulatory environment where they do have direct access to generate revenue streams from the 
energy and ancillary services markets; I will explore this model in greater detail in Part IV. A 
limited departure of this are the demand response participants who participated in the IESO’s 
auction. However, demand response is perhaps easier to coordinate from an operational standpoint. 
Thus, ultimately, what emerges is a regime with a slightly modified trajectory due to the adoption 
of LDC-deployed NWS, which is implemented through rule changes made by regime actors to 
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expand the capabilities of established regime actors. I have noted above that Ontario’s approach is 
a transformation pathway with the added potential to morph into a reconfiguration pathway; I will 
explore this idea in greater detail in Part IV while making discrete recommendations as to how to 
achieve this “jump between pathways.” 
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PART IV: MARKET & REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR A 
DECENTRALIZED POWER SYSTEM 
 
 
4.1. Shortfalls of Ontario’s Approach in Light of the Sustainability Objectives 
 
 In Part III of this paper, I exposited Ontario’s approach to grid modernization, as it pertains 
to aspects of grid decentralization through the integration of DERs. This exposition identified 
Ontario’s approach through an examination of the statutorily enshrined system planning and policy 
development as it relates to the evolution of the industry, such as the MOE’s 2017 LTEP and 
subsequent Implementation Plans. I concluded that this approach prioritizes the enabling of LDCs 
to deploy DERs through NWS and I further commented on the structural implications of this 
approach based on Geels’ typology of transitional pathways, where a transformation pathway, 
characterized as being driven by internal adjustments to the regime with the established actors 
remaining dominant, as being illustrative of the structural implications of Ontario’s approach. 
However, as this paper mentioned in Part I, there is another dimension to this transition being a 
sustainability transition, which must respect the sustainability objectives established in Part I, and 
so, it is important to analyze the potential impacts of Ontario’s approach on the sustainability 
objectives; the structural implications mentioned in Part III are also be relevant (i.e.  minimizing 
the potential for new entrants through the transformation pathway). Thus in the following section 
I will analyze the consequences of Ontario’s approach in light of the sustainability objectives and 
put forward that there are several shortfalls that can be better addressed through a configuration 
pathway.  
 
Ontario’s LDC-Led Deployment of DERs and Sustainability Objectives 
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 This analysis builds off of the one in Part I, which supports why a decentralized grid with 
a high integration of DERs respects the sustainability objectives. Whereas the analysis in Part I is 
focused on DERs conceptually as a technology, this analysis will instead focus on alternative 
pathways of integrating DERs as there is a broad spectrum of what a decentralized grid means and 
looks like. The starting position is based on Ontario’s LDC-deployed NWS approach and I will 
recommend alternatives accordingly as the analysis progresses. The majority of the shortfalls that 
I will conclude are reserved for objectives 2 and 3, covering economic responsibility and 
distribution effects, respectively. 
 
Sustainability Objective #1: Environmental Integrity 
 With respect to this objective, there is not much to be said as the approach does not change 
the nature of the technology nor does the approach have any directly observable environmental 
impacts that can be commented on. The only thing to be said, as a caveat to the point that 
predominantly DERs use renewable generation techniques and storage has the ability to displace 
centralized peaker plants that are mostly gas-fired, is that the life cycles of chemical batteries (as 
opposed to thermal and mechanical) and solar PV cells in particular can have unsustainable effects 
upstream the supply chain as the materials and minerals used in the manufacturing of these 
equipment such as silicon and lithium need to be mined and processed (Hernandez et al., 2014). 
This point goes mainly to DERs rather the process. 
 
Sustainability Objective #2: Economic Responsibility and Adaptive Capacity 
 In terms of values encompassed under the economic responsibility objective, the LDC-
deployed NWS model is an improvement, although on a limited scale, over the government driven 
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centralized system planning mechanism enshrined in Ontario’s statutory framework as mentioned 
in Part II. This is because, in some respects, it enables the planning process to occur from the 
bottom-up. In essence, this contributes to “right-sizing” the system because local constraints are 
resolved using local solutions rather than relying on reinforcement of the bulk system, which is 
costly and inefficient due to the amount of losses that occur at every stage before the benefits are 
delivered to the distribution-constrained load pocket (Lovins, 2003); I will not even go on to 
mention the inefficiency of the procurement mechanisms. That said, the reason that I stated that 
this was only an improvement on a limited scale is because of the limited applications of NWS; 
and by limited applications I am referring to the grid services that NWS is meant to provide and 
its potential to provide substantially more grid services with the necessary market and regulatory 
design. According to the NWS model contemplated in Ontario, it is meant to target constraints that 
would otherwise be resolved through traditional LDC investments such as transformers and 
additional lines to resolve congestion and power quality issues. In this sense, NWS can be a cost 
and time effective alternative that strategically placed can also offer other system benefits such as 
resiliency and improves overall adaptive capacity, depending on whether the DERs are owned by 
the LDC or rather by a third party developer or even customer and on the structure of the 
commercial arrangement over the control of the asset. In terms of the potential to provide 
substantially more grid services, I will explore this idea and its implications below as well as in 
the following sections. 
 
Sustainability Objective #3: Distributional Effects, Innovation, and Individual Choice 
 Building off of what was said above, as the POWER.HOUSE project reveals, LDCs with 
greater financial resources and operational capacity such as Alectra have bigger plans for 
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deploying LDCs and providing greater grid services such as secondary services including voltage 
and frequency regulation and even potentially primary services such as energy, operating reserve, 
and capacity. However, I question the distributional effects of this approach, specifically in terms 
of providing consumer choice, creating business opportunity, and innovation; additionally, there 
is something to be said about the impacts to pricing allocation among consumer groups, especially 
low-income consumers.  
Although large LDCs such as Alectra, perhaps have the capacity to start deploying DERs 
either among their customers, granted that the permissive regulations are implemented, it remains 
to be seen how these additional expenditures will be reflected in the LDCs’ accounting books. On 
the one hand, if this falls under the utility’s regulated business then these costs will presumably be 
passed off to the rate-base. On the other hand, if this falls under the utility’s unregulated business, 
through the affiliate, then it is questionable how effective this strategy is given the lack of retail 
competition and the disparate capabilities of different LDCs to offer DER products. This point on 
lack of retail spills over into the debate about consumer choice. This is because, as mentioned in 
Part III, if the focus of the regulatory changes is to expand the scope of business activity and 
recoverable investments for LDCs, then they remain the dominant actors with geographic 
monopolies, leaving consumers constrained for choice because they cannot access potentially 
cheaper and more value-added products such as DER systems and services that can be offered by 
third party retailers.  
Throughout this section I have been working under assumption that there is or will be a 
lack of retail competition and offerings related to DERs. However, a simple perusing of the Ontario 
market will reinforce this. The reason for this, I put forward, is that this is due to a lack of market 
mechanisms that would provide these retailers with access to revenue streams which would afford 
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them the opportunity to finance the systems to customers with a revenue-sharing arrangement 
because the saving that would come from say a net metering arrangement would be substantially 
inadequate. I will explore the idea of providing market mechanisms to access revenue streams in 
the next section in greater detail. That said, this same point on lack retailing also speaks to 
innovation because presumably unregulated LDC affiliates, if they are to shoulder the costs of 
deploying DERs will need additional resources and organizational capacity for research and 
development and without proper channels to revenue streams will not be able to support such 
developments.   
One clear example of a successful segment of the electricity retailing market in Ontario 
with clear channels to access revenue streams is Demand Response (DR). DR services used to be 
procured through capacity-style contracts until they transitioned into an auction mechanism 
through IESO’s Market Renewal initiative, where third-party retailers enter into commercial 
arrangements with electricity consumers to remotely manage their energy consumption and turn it 
down in events of peak demand and in return split the revenues that are paid out from the IESO 
(IESO, 2017). Another example, although a more hotly debated policy choice, is the Industrial 
Accelerator Program (IAP) offered by the IESO, also known as “GA busting.” This is mainly 
targeted at Class A consumers mostly comprised of the industrial and commercial segment, who 
can reduce the Global Adjustment (GA) component that makes up the rate that they pay for 
electricity. Both of the GA and DR segments of the retailing market demonstrate (a) that creating 
channels to revenue streams fosters an environment for third party retailers to compete and (b) that 
this creates a plethora of options for consumers and an array of innovative services and benefits 
that regulated utilities are either restricted from providing or do not have the resources and capacity 
to provide.  
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This logic of creating business opportunity and fostering innovation can also be applied to 
assessing the impacts of retail competition on different consumer groups, especially low-income 
consumers, although a much more tenuous one that requires greater study. The contention here is 
that on the one hand, if third party retailers are deploying DERs then this exacerbates the “utility 
death spiral” where revenues for LDCs decrease because less electricity is being purchased from 
the grid and consequently they raise prices for the other consumers. The assumption here is that 
low-income consumers may not be desirable customers for third-party retailers and thus they are 
the ones who are most reliant on the grid and end up paying the higher prices. On the other hand, 
it is possible that there may be retailers who specifically focus on the low-income consumer 
segment and may even be able to offer better prices than LDCs. However, both these points require 
further study and remain inconclusive based on the conjecture of their assumptions. 
Now that I have illuminated some of the debates and identified the shortfalls, in my 
opinion, of Ontario’s approach, I will move on to put forward the model of DER integration that I 
believe better supports the sustainability objectives mentioned that can be brought about through 
a reconfiguration pathway. This reconfiguration model that I support, in short, is focused on 
fostering an environment for retail competition in DER deployment. To phrase as a direct 
comparison, in what follows, I advocate for retailer-deployed DERs as opposed to LDC-deployed 
DERs. 
 
4.2. Grid Architecture, Market Mechanisms, and Regulation of Retailer-Deployed DERs 
I have identified the retailer-deployed DERs model as being an improvement, in my 
opinion, over the LDC-deployed DERs model because it better achieves the sustainability 
objectives identified in this paper. However, neither of these models can occur by themselves due 
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to the statutory frame and restrictive regulations that govern the electricity sector, which have been 
previously discussed in Parts II and III. Given that this paper is about transitions and Ontario’s 
approach is driven by careful deliberation of how to achieve certain desirable outcomes, this 
section will present an approach that focuses on the aspects that need to implemented in order to 
facilitate the emergence of a retailer-deployed DERs transition. Specifically, I will speak to three 
key areas, which are: (a) the operational architecture of the grid that must be able to support two-
way power flows at the distribution level, which is inextricably tied to the future role of distribution 
utilities; (b) market mechanisms in the form of platforms (and their supporting economic 
infrastructure) that will provide the channels to access revenue streams; and (c) the regulatory 
framework for retail competition. In the last section, I will move on to speak to how these changes 
can be implemented by way of the reconfiguration pathway. 
 
Grid Architecture 
 Citing the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, grid architecture refers to “the 
conceptual model that defines the structure, behaviour, and essential limits of a [power] system.” 
(Roberts, 2018). Currently speaking then, Ontario, like most other jurisdictions, has a centralized 
top-down system where electricity is procured predominantly at the transmission level, sold on 
wholesale energy markets to distributors and delivered to the customers through interconnections 
to the distribution network (King, 2016). That said, it is evident why this model cannot work where 
DERs, being inherently distribution-connected, provide grid services through two-way power 
flows. In the DER-integrated model, at the very least, visibility is needed to monitor power flows, 
which speaks to the emerging role of distribution utilities, who currently do not have visibility into 
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their networks but own and maintain them to deliver their obligations as the standard supplier 
(EDA, 2017; Roberts, 2018).  
 Chapter 6 of the MIT “Utility of the Future” report, entitled “Restructuring Revisited: 
Electricity Industry Structure in a More Distributed Future” envisions several alternative models 
of grid architecture that are better suited for a distributed grid that revolve around transitioning the 
role of current Distribution Network Owners (DNO) to Distribution System Operators (DSO) that 
reflect a role that closer resembles that of the Transmission System Operator (TSO) (MIT, 2016). 
Specifically, with this type of “restructuring”, the MIT report conceives that the focus is on “the 
proper role of electricity distribution utilities, the potential need for a DSO, the establishment of 
market structures or platforms that enable the provision of multiple electricity services by DERs 
of all kinds, and the emerging role of DER aggregators and other new DER business models.” 
(MIT, 2016). The purpose of this is “allocate the three critical functions of an electricity market”, 
which are (a) “the provision of a market platform to facilitate transactions”; (b) “the provision of 
a physical network built and maintained to enable the flow of electricity between the points of 
production and consumptions; and (c) “the provision of a system operator to coordinate power 
flows while managing the technical constraints of the grid (MIT, 2016).  
 One of the MIT’s alternative models is fundamentally similar to the FINO model 
envisioned by the EDA in its Vision Paper. In this this model, the “distribution network owner and 
operator” (DNO/SO), the three critical functions of an electricity market of distribution network 
provider (i.e. owner), operator, and market platform are delivered by the utility (MIT, 2016). 
Effectively speaking, the utility, within its service region (e.g. Local Distribution Area), would 
maintain the physical infrastructure, operate the network by “actively managing distribution assets 
and coordinating the dispatch of DERs to provide distribution network services (DNO/SO),” and 
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establishing market and procurement processes involved with system operation (MIT, 2016). The 
efficiency of this model comes from the gains made from the economies of scope that of the 
entity’s service offerings and responsibilities. This includes leveraging the data gathered through 
system visibility to determine the locational value of service in order to send the most efficient 
price signals, and operate optimally competitive and transparent procurement processes for 
network services, as well as to reveal the price of other products such as NWS (MIT, 2016).  
That said, there are a number of challenges associated with this model. One challenge is 
how to align these different business activities with the traditional role and business model of rate-
base regulated utility (MIT, 2016). Overcoming these challenges would include reviewing the 
regulatory framework for rate-base application decisions especially with relation to capital and 
operational expenditures in order to level the playing field for competition between contracting 
DER services and traditional investments (MIT, 2016; EDA, 2017). Another major challenge is 
the independence between different functions that have the potential to encounter conflicts of 
interest (MIT, 2016). This is directly applicable to the second and third main functions of a FINO, 
which involve the ownership and operation of DERs deployed and providing services to the grid. 
This means that if left unchecked, the FINO could significantly undermine the competition and 
efficiency of markets if it is involved as a market participant and dispatch decision-maker. 
However, this can be remedied through legal unbundling, which involves setting up regulatory 
rules and requires enforcement, or through structural unbundling, which involves separating 
different functional arms of an entity (MIT, 2016); the separation between the regulated business 
of an LDC and affiliates is an example of both of these principles as the OEB imposes license 
conditions on LDCs that include abiding by the Affiliate Relationship Code.  
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With respect to system planning, matters are slightly complicated in the Ontario context 
because unlike most other jurisdictions, Ontario LDCs are not Load Serving Entities (LSEs), which 
means they are not responsible for procuring capacity for changing load forecasts but depend on 
the IESO to procure (could also be instructed by Ministerial Directives) capacity and purchase it 
from the IESO-administered markets (Clark, Stoll, and Cass, 2012). This needs to be reconciled 
with the necessity to provide non-discriminatory and open-access connection of DERs (the cost of 
which need not be socialized but paid to the LDC instead). It has also been suggested that this may 
have a cascading effect because as more DERs are connected and offer primary services such as 
energy and capacity, more DERs will be required to provide secondary services to support network 
operations through NWS and have the benefit of deferring traditional investments into reinforcing 
the infrastructure (Navigant Consulting, 2018). Notionally, however, this can be accomplished by 
factoring in the integration of DER into distribution system planning and accordingly adjust its 
load forecasts and purchasing made from the wholesale markets while servicing its LDA as the 
standard supplier.  
 
Electricity Market Platform Design 
 Our epistemological understanding of what a platform is: a structure used to “create market 
processes within specific institutional contexts to aggregate diffuse private and contextual 
knowledge and enable value creation within exchanges through the platform.” (Kiesling, 2018). 
Additionally, this effectively provides a channel for “an open participative infrastructure for those 
interactions and has the ancillary responsibility to set governing conditions.” (Kiesling, 2018). 
Meanwhile our economic understanding dictates that “platform business models emerge and thrive 
because of the potential profit in reducing transaction costs to connect people for the mutual benefit 
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as value creation.” (Kiesling, 2018). As a prevalent example in the local context that is not to be 
overlooked is the IESO-Administered Markets, where Ontario wholesale market participants 
provide bids and offers on electricity services. Other examples although from different industries 
are securities exchanges and more recently, Uber and Airbnb. It becomes clear, from these 
illuminating examples, how a platform application could exist in the context of a competitive retail 
market; although in numerous forms falling on a spectrum.  
 This variation in form mostly consists at the level of implementation. Building off of what 
was said above about grid architecture, the question is whether a future-LDCs, with visibility into 
their respective systems, should also offer a platform as a market mechanism to provide a channel 
to access revenue streams for competing firms, or should this be left with the current market 
administrator (i.e. IESO), recognizing several of option in between. The reason for presenting this 
question in the first place as opposed to simply accepting he status quo is because there are some 
inherent obstacles in keeping the market structures business-as-usual. For example, in the current 
IESO-Administered Markets, transactions between the participants occur at the transmission level; 
for example, generators inject electricity at the bulk level where it is purchased by LDCs and the 
transaction ends at the interconnection node where it is stepped down to the voltage level of the 
LDA. Throughout the process, the IESO has full visibility into the power flows. However, with 
DERs, the paradigm is different, where the assets providing grid services, are being dispatched at 
the distribution level, where future-LDCs may have visibility into. Thus under the current grid 
architecture, the platform for participation, since the source of revenue is not in the market of 
financing out DER systems alone, is the wholesale market, presuming that rules and requirements 
of market participation are permissive of the characteristics of DERs. An example of this was 
demonstrated in recent news when Sunrun cleared 20 MW of capacity in ISO-New England’s 
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capacity auction (Spector, 2019). Additionally, the introduction of an Incremental Capacity 
Cuction (ICA) through IESO’s Market Renewal notionally make this a viable option in Ontario, 
granted the Market Rules accommodate the technical and economic characteristics of remotely 
dispatched and aggregated DERs (IESO, 2017).  
 However, this debate has spawned the potential of a distribution-level market that can be 
offered through a platform administered by a capable DSO. If designed properly, a distribution-
level market can secure reliable electricity at least cost to consumers (Cramton, 2018). 
Economically speaking, it also has the potential to achieve short run efficiency, which is making 
the best use of existing resources; and long run efficiency, which is promoting efficient investment 
in new resources (Cramton, 2018). On this point, it is worth taking a brief detour to look at 
electricity market design at a high-level. The MIT report distinguishes between essentially two 
types of electricity services that can be sold to the grid: energy-related (or primary) and network-
related (or secondary) services (Pérez-Arriaga, Burger, and Gómez, 2016). Primary services 
include electric energy, various operating reserves, black-start capability, and firm capacity; while 
secondary services include: network connection, reactive power for regulation and power quality 
(Pérez-Arriaga, Burger, and Gómez, 2016). DERs, especially aggregated in a diverse portfolio, 
have the potential to provide all of these services. Additionally, the MIT report contemplates that 
new services may arise in a decentralized grid, such as flexible ramping products that greater DER 
usage will necessitate but also be able to provide.  
There is also something to be said about the structure of electricity markets. Peter Cramton 
helps break down the process and components stating that the two core elements are a day-ahead 
market for optimal scheduling and real-time markets for real-time dispatch respecting system 
constraints (Cramton, 2018). The spot market decides the wholesale price of electricity through 
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the market clearing price, which is based on the transparent offers and bids submitted by the 
participants. Cramton, however, comments on the practice of using Locational Marginal Pricing 
(LMP), which varies price due its locational value, recognizing that due to transmission 
constraints, energy and related services may have different values even at the same time (Cramton, 
2018). However, that said, this economic ideal is never met due to the exercise of market power, 
unpriced externalities such as carbon emissions, and other subsidies that distort the pricing signals. 
In Ontario especially, there is no day-ahead market and there is no LMP. Instead, there is a 
commitment process and generators get “make-whole” payments to cover them for the constraint-
created discrepancies that occur between scheduling and dispatch and the Hourly Ontario Energy 
Price (HOEP) is determined only based on time, ignoring location (IESO, 2017). However, the 
IESO’s Market Renewal Project is working to implement both of the measures prescribed by 
Cramton (IESO, 2017). Although this is a step in the right direction, if that direction aspires to 
letting market forces prevail, but there are a few other obstacles: Ontario still has largely long-term 
contract procurement of resources which have a capped and regulated price and it recently got rid 
of its carbon pricing mechanism and thus price distortions persist.  
In light of the above, proponents such as Tabors, Caramanis, et al. argue that these features 
could be constructed and offered through a market platform as the distribution level (Tabors et al., 
2018). As a matter of fact, they argue that it is a necessary component for a competitive retail 
market to thrive. However, they posit that a transactive platform must have the correct economic 
infrastructure to support it and incentivize participation, which is best served by the concept of a 
distribution locational marginal pricing (DLMP) (Tabors et al., 2018). This notion simply extends 
the logic of the LMP but is computed on a more granular scale at nodes on the distribution system 
as opposed to the bulk system. The concept of a distribution-level market has gained traction and 
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is actually explicitly supported by the FINO model put forward in the EDA Vision Paper, 
especially the support of an “LMP+D” that Tabors, Caramanis, et al. describe (EDA, 2017). 
Furthermore, Alectra together with IBM (and Interac) have demonstrated a proof of concept for 
an ancillary services market using a blockchain platform that they have collaboratively created. 
This demonstration was showcased at the IESO Electricity Summit on June 11, 2018. 
According to Vikram Singh of Alectra and Curtis Miles of IBM, the proof-of-concept is an 
“end-to-end transactive platform that can facilitate an ancillary services market.” This is meant to 
“bring market services down to DERs so that no manual intermediation is required to extract, 
quantify, and settle value.” The demonstration exhibits a mobile application, where participants 
can see the supported network of assets and get signaled when a triggering event causes the 
platform provider, Alectra in this case, to procure ancillary services from the network. However, 
there are some notable peculiarities about the Alectra model: in terms of valuing DER services, 
the blockchain energy network (BEN) includes a financial partner, Interac, which has “tokenized” 
the value instead of valuing and attributing real currency value to the services, thus isolating it 
from market pricing structures. Additionally, the market has limited products that “prosumers” can 
provide bids and offers for, mainly restricted to several ancillary services. Also, the grid 
infrastructure of the conceptual design presents Alectra as the aggregators for the entire LDA that 
communicates with the IESO to rely on for market information and thus acting as the connection 
of how the distribution level market and the wholesale market interact.  
Thus if the goal is to incentivize development of BTM DER and participation by those 
assets in providing grid level services then the important considerations are: What is proper role 
of the future-LDC with respect to the ownership of assets and market administration? Should it 
deploy DERs and operate those DERs for the benefit of its own network or the transmission level 
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as well? Should it offer a distribution level market platform or should it simply act as an aggregator 
of the DERs deployed on its network for participation at the wholesale level? Should it be 
prohibited from owning assets except for limited circumstances for reliability purposes? If there 
are distribution level markets, should there be individual markets for each LDA? Should third party 
retailers who deploy DERs be able to contribute resources located in another LDA in the market 
of a different LDA? Should these markets be structured as spot markets or limited to other 
procurement arrangements? On what basis should services be valued and priced?  
 
Regulation of Competitive Retail in Electricity 
 The EDA Vision Paper supports the position that LDCs are best positioned to deploy DERs 
on the basis, among others, that “Ontario does not have a retail market for electricity.” (EDA, 
2017). As a leeway into this section, it is worth debunking that statement. At first instance, the 
OEB website clearly lists a number of active electricity retailers and has a license category for 
parties engaging in electricity retailing, which is defined under the OEB Act. That said, the retailing 
market in Ontario has been called a “historical anachronism” that arose out of specific market 
conditions that were quickly changed. The predominant business model of these retailers was that, 
once the competitive wholesale market opened, these retailers would procure generation supply 
through forward contracts to avoid the volatility of the spot markets and adjust the pricing structure 
to provide a guaranteed locked-in retail electricity price, the value of this being the impression to 
consumers that they are hedging their risk against rising electricity costs, which was the trend at 
the time. However, due to policy intervention by way of a retail price freeze and a return to long-
term centralized planning and procurement, coupled with prevalent public dissatisfaction with 
retailers conduct that brought fourth closer regulation of these entities, effectively changed the 
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market conditions so drastically that there was no longer a business case for these types of retailers 
(Clark, Stoll, and Cass, 2012; Winfield and MacWhirter, 2019). Now retailing is done through the 
affiliate arm of LDCs. 
 However, the type of retailing that I present in this paper is entirely different based on the 
value that they present, which is deploying DERs thus owning physical assets on the grid, and 
acting as an aggregator thus operating assets through communicative technologies and offering 
services not only behind the meter, but also to the system as a whole. In practice this would be 
similar to the POWER.HOUSE project where separate units are aggregated into virtual power 
plants, or DR aggregators who aggregate loads and submit offers on auction products, these would 
comprise some of the competitive retailers who would comprise the market, and would in nearly 
all cases have some third party agreement between the service provider and a customer of 
electricity products or services. Another possible potential business model would be firms who 
sell DERs that are primarily not meant to provide an energy service such as a smart thermostat, 
lights and appliances, and even electric vehicle companies and EV charging infrastructure, to name 
a few.  
 The MIT report weighs in the value of having aggregators and retail energy service 
providers. Firstly, it makes a distinction that not all electricity retailing is aggregation (Burger, 
Chavez-Ávila, Battle, and Pérez-Arriaga, 2016). With consumers taking the more prosumer role 
that requires more active energy management, there will undoubtedly be providers of services such 
as energy monitoring, advice, and efficiency products (Burger, Chavez-Ávila, Battle, and Pérez-
Arriaga, 2016). It remains to be see what will constitute retailing and what will not for regulatory 
purposes as EV charging infrastructure and smart thermostats continue to proliferate. With respect 
to aggregation, where the retailer will deploy a DER asset (or not), operate the asset, and “group 
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distinct assets and engage them in power markets or selling services to the operator,” effectively 
acting as portfolio of assets under management (Burger, Chavez-Ávila, Battle, and Pérez-Arriaga, 
2016). The report further goes on to posit that there are three types of values that DERs can 
provide: fundamental or intrinsic, transitory, and opportunistic (Burger, Chavez-Ávila, Battle, and 
Pérez-Arriaga, 2016). Fundamental or intrinsic value is effectively speaking, the economic value 
that DERs in an ideal market design can provide and contribute net system benefits (i.e. driving 
down costs). This includes economies of scale, economies of scope, and overall reduction of 
transaction costs; the report refers to the efficiency gained by EnerNOC’s centralization of 
computing power.  
 However, the report states that the maximum of gain of these efficiencies occur when there 
is only one aggregator (i.e. DSO) and this must be carefully balanced against other values such as 
competition, which incentivizes aggregators to provide “customized and innovative solutions” as 
retail markets are seen as better designed to “deliver desired levels of consumer engagement and 
value added services.” (Burger, Chavez-Ávila, Battle, and Pérez-Arriaga, 2016). Meanwhile, 
transitory value stems from the effect of DERs that is it provides load to be price responsive and 
flexible where it used to be considered inflexible due to a lack of control or willingness. This 
includes the “mobilization of agents” who would otherwise be left out from participating on the 
power markets due to the “standardized products that operators create.” (Burger, Chavez-Ávila, 
Battle, and Pérez-Arriaga, 2016). It also reduces system complexity and information gaps, which 
by providing forecasts for peaking time can help hedge risk and optimal scheduling. However, the 
report predicts that as the name suggests, this value “wanes over time as technical and regulatory 
conditions improve.” (Burger, Chavez-Ávila, Battle, and Pérez-Arriaga, 2016). 
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Lastly, opportunistic value is when private value outweighs the net benefits flowing to the 
system and is caused by regulatory flaws and arbitrage (Burger, Chavez-Ávila, Battle, and Pérez-
Arriaga, 2016). Arguably, the Industrial Accelerator Program can be seen as this type of benefit, 
although it is an overt economic policy decision. This is because it enables Class A customers to 
reduce their contribution to the Ontario Global Adjustment charge, while Class B consumers, who 
cannot organize or coordinate their consumption in the same way have to pay an increased amount 
to cover the transferred cost. That said, by the same logic, with a similar policy favouring Class B 
consumers and a competitive aggregator targeting residential consumers level the playing field. 
Alternatively, these unequitable benefits are said to persist around a lack of a proper market 
structure and can conversely be avoided in the presence of one.  
Thus although it evidently desirable to have a competitive electricity retailing market with 
aggregators who deploy DER assets and participate in power markets sharing revenue with the site 
hosts, there a few areas of regulation that require consideration: Perhaps at the top of the list is the 
need to have a clear understanding and definition of what retailing entails and what does not. The 
current definition under s. 56 of the OEB Act contemplates the offering or selling electricity, as 
well as acting or offering to act as a broker with respect to selling electricity. It is a question if this 
definition needs to be expanded to include other energy services such as monitoring or peak saving 
as to otherwise encompass business models such as a load aggregator controlling smart 
thermostats. This would require a consideration of the type of commercial agreement the retailer 
has and more importantly, what data does the retailer have access to for operational purposes, 
including the customer’s metered data. Presumably any arrangement between a retailer and a 
customer where the retailer has control over energy management warrants some clear code of 
conduct and a mechanism for recourse if the customer’s preferences are interfered with as the 
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consequences may be grave. Market participation is a separate issue as any participants would be 
required to register under the existing IESO-administered markets regime or another if distribution 
level markets should arise. With regards to the assets themselves, any connection requires an 
impact assessment on the system and the retailers should have to shoulder that cost, especially if 
the system will inject energy into the system as opposed to a demand response asset. Registration 
of any facility should also be mandated so the capabilities and the location of the assets are well 
mapped out and system capacities are understood. However, the most important factor to keep in 
mind is to stay agnostic as to the business models as to not preclude future innovation.  
 
4.3. Reconfiguration as a Pathway to a Competitive Retail DER Market 
 
 Verbong and Geels conducted an MLP analysis of the Dutch and European electricity 
systems, operationalized at the level of generation and infrastructure, and characterized three 
potential alternatives under the transformation, reconfiguration, and de-alignment/re-alignment 
pathways, respectively, with distributed generation as the de-alignment/re-alignment pathway 
(Verbong and Geels, 2010). In my analysis of the Ontario system, I had a different characterization 
of Ontario’s trajectory as a transformation with the possibility to jump to reconfiguration pathway 
based on its approach. This is discrepancy is acceptable and inevitable in MLP analyses because 
of the different actors, rules, and structures that exist between different regions and contexts. 
Verbong and Geels in supporting their characterization, mostly rely on the assumption that 
landscape factors, mainly spikes in oil prices from the middle east and gas prices from Russia due 
to political volatility, will become so extreme that consumers will lose hope in the established 
system and turn to experimenting with micro-grids (Verbong and Geels, 2010). Communities will 
turn inwards and become focused on local and regional solutions, which will ultimately yield a 
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primarily decentralized grid with central generation used for backup and balancing purposes. They 
additionally claim that this is the least likely scenario to materialize due to the fact that it is the 
most far removed from the status quo (Verbong and Geels, 2010).  
 In the Ontario context, as I have demonstrated in Part III, there is already a demonstrated 
desire to support the deployment of DERs. However, this desire is limited to the use of DERs in 
local and niche solutions rather than a more significant paradigmatic shift. This is why I 
characterize this approach as a transformation pathway. On the one hand, landscape pressures such 
as actions to combat climate change as well as, and perhaps more significantly, consumer and 
industry trends are also pushing towards at least partial decentralization. On the other hand, the 
level of disruption of is limited. What I mean by this is that neither the landscape pressures nor 
radical niche innovations are sufficiently potent to permeate and significantly alter the regime. For 
reasons stated in Parts II and III, the process of niche-cumulation, whereby the niche breaks into 
the regime, cannot fully occur in the Ontario context due to the statutory framework, which 
explicitly prescribes and heavily regulates the electricity sector. Thus the niche cannot become 
developed enough to break into the regime. Additionally, due to the technology and market 
conditions not being developed enough, the adoption of BTM DERs is not significant enough to 
trigger the “utility death spiral” to such proportions as to force a major shift in the regime. Thus 
Ontario’s approach aims to selectively deploy DERs, mostly through the established LDCs, with 
a minimal role for third-party developers to participate, which is descriptive of the transformation 
pathway.  
 That said, there is a potential for a more significant shift towards the use of DERs, however, 
my vision of a decentralized grid in Ontario differs from the one envisioned by Verbong and Geels. 
Mainly, I view this shift as leading to a “partial decentralization” where the primary characteristic 
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is not “loosely coupled micro-grids” but rather a high-penetration of BTM DERs that are 
dynamically competing with centralized assets, still within predominantly the same grid paradigm. 
The defining feature of this model is a competitive retail market, which is desirable due to its 
contribution to achieving the sustainability objectives identified in Part I. To get this state, a 
reconfiguration pathway needs to be taken. This is not necessarily drastically different from 
Ontario’s current approach, but rather more comprehensive, detailed, and deliberate, which is why 
there is a potential to “jump” to this pathway as contemplated by the transitions literature. To make 
this jump, the reconfiguration must focus on making adjustment and recoordinating regime 
elements that would enable the niche to develop through the process of niche-cumulation. I have 
already identified these elements that require attention and depend on regime changes as being 
market design, infrastructure requirements, and organizational issues and business models, or as I 
have recharacterized them: grid architecture, market platform design, and regulation of a 
competitive retail segment. The following details specific recommendations for each area: 
 
Grid Architecture – Recommendations 
 These strategic changes should be designed to foster an industry structure where the natural 
monopoly components, specifically the distribution network, is maintained, however it should 
allow a competitive and dynamic marketplace to thrive dominated by a plethora of innovative 
business models who regularly engage consumers, deploy energy resources, and act as a provider 
of choice and diffuser of costs. There are several ways to achieve this, depending essentially on 
whether distributors will provide market platforms for their respective LDA or whether the 
wholesale market will be the predominant platform for participation administered by the bulk 
system operator. More importantly, however, is that there are commonalities that are necessary in 
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either scenario. First, grid visibility is paramount for the management of two-way power flows 
throughout the distribution grid (EDA, 2018). This means that investments need to be made into 
the system. The EDA roadmap recommends enabling and even incentivizing LDCs to make these 
investments either by allowing them to pass off these costs through the rate-base or through a 
centrally funded pool (e.g. IESO Conservation Fund). Second, in addition to visibility there must 
be well-defined protocol for coordinating the activities of distributed resources with the bulk 
system operator (More Than Smart, 2017); whether aggregators of resources should be able to do 
this directly with the ISO or only through the intermediation of a distributor is another question 
entirely. Third, viable revenue streams should be available to distributors as their role is ever 
important in the proper management of a decentralized grid, even if they do not own assets. Fourth, 
as the EDA roadmap suggests, it is important, especially in the Ontario context, to allow LDCs to 
work together to reduce costs and make the right decisions with respect to buying or making 
solutions in house (EDA, 2018).  
 The changes noted above can be implemented through policy and regulatory tools. This 
refers to the powers of regulators in their frameworks of assessment and decision making, which 
need to be changed to reflect a new reality and incentivize distributors to facilitate certain outcome. 
However, more fundamental changes can be made through legislative tools; these changes could 
include specific restrictions or permissions on business activities of prescribed actors and even 
industry restructuring. For example, the EDA roadmap recommends amending sections 71(3) and 
80 of the OEB Act, which restrict distributor ownership over generation assets up to a certain 
capacity (currently 10MW) and requires filing a notice with the OEB upon such acquisition, 
respectively. Subsequently, the OEB must assess the acquisition against the potential of anti-
competitive effects. I do not necessarily agree with the removal of the restriction on ownership as 
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I advocate for a competitive retail marketplace in this paper but some limited exceptions subject 
to section 80 may be warranted for reliability purposes. Other factors that the EDA roadmap 
considers are clarifications of DERs for treatment purposes, as well as clarification of LDC/FINO 
rights over ownership and control of BTM assets, again a more contested point where the goal is 
to design an environment where retail competition – where retailers are largely aggregators – is 
the goal (EDA, 2018). I align myself more with the position put forward in the MIT report, which 
is on the point of grid architecture, it favours independent DSOs (MIT, 2016). 
 The main rationale behind an independent DSO is to avoid the conflict of interests between 
the entity’s network and commercial components of the distribution company, which is a principle 
widely accepted today and manifested through the division of LDCs from their unregulated 
affiliates, who handle the retail segment of the market. This rationale is inherently concerned with 
anti-competitive behaviour and cross-subsidization of distribution businesses, that have a regional 
monopoly and monopoly ownership over the distribution network, from having an unfair 
advantage over potential third party providers who must truly compete in the market place without 
exclusivity rights or the ability to socialize costs through the rate-base. The corollary of this is the 
statutorily enshrined right to an open-access grid, which is fundamental to a functional DERs 
market where the value of distributed assets extends from beyond behind-the-meter to provide grid 
services. That said, applying these principles to the DSO concept is more complex because the 
now the network component expands to include a market component, which make it all the more 
vital to keep separate from the commercial component of the business.  
Thus there are several tools that can be used to guide the evolution of the industry including 
policy, regulatory, and legislative. However, the most important thing is to envision which values 
to prioritize and what industry structure best correspondents to those values and arrange the details 
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accordingly. In this paper, I advocate for the model that best achieves a competitive retail market 
where distributed resources can compete for the provision of electricity services. However, this 
vision is underpinned by the necessity for visibility and maintenance of the distribution network 
to enable monitoring and analysis of historical and real-time power flows, a role the current 
distributors are uniquely and best positioned to provide. That said, the vision of a competitive retail 
market would be undermined if the entity responsible for approving connections, managing power 
flows, and perhaps administering a market, would also own assets that compete in the provision 
of the same services, unless for some limited circumstances (MIT, 2016). That said, the question 
of whether DSO should be able to solely operate assets, even behind-the-meter ones is another 
matter that requires further examination.  
 
Electricity Market Platform Design - Recommendations 
 Part of the consideration that need to be made for this aspect is how it connects to the future 
role of distributors, mainly by affecting their planning function and potentially providing a market 
platform, and partly it speaks to the more detailed matter of the design of the market, regardless of 
how it is administered. The first part of this matter is more relevant because it can be implemented 
through policy, regulatory, and legislative tools while the second part cannot and rests with the 
system operator, whether transmission or distribution, that administers the market and determines 
the market rules. With respect to market administration, there are two visions presented in this 
paper. First is that of the “modified status quo,” where the current system operators continue to 
administer the markets, including capacity auctions but designs the rules to accommodate the 
operational constraints of distributed resources so that they can compete on even footing with 
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centralized assets. Additionally, there may further opportunity for DERs to provide services 
through targeted NWS procurement processes by distributors.  
 Under this model, there would presumably be some intermediation between the owner and 
operator of the participating DER and the ISO market administrator by way of the DSO as they 
would be party with the visibility into the network. This would affect distribution system planning 
as DSO would need to accommodate the integration into DERs into their networks while 
maintaining reliability and fairly allocating costs. However, this would be that different under the 
second vision presented in this paper, which is that of the “distribution level market,” where the 
DSOs would shift even closer to the ISO role by providing some platform with structured products 
that providers can submit their offers on and participants can bid on those services through the 
structured markets; there can also be interaction between distribution level markets and the 
wholesale market. With respect to market design, the platform can be operated by the DSO and 
offer spot markets for energy, ancillary services, reserves, and capacity; DSO could hold a parallel 
procurement process for NWS. In this way, distributed services could compete with centralized 
sources but indirectly through different markets that could have varying rules that respect the 
characteristics and operational constraints of its participating resource types.  
Either way, the MIT report emphasizes that the crucial component in any of these events 
is having the correct pricing and remuneration structures. Specifically, the report recommends a 
“comprehensive system of prices and regulated charges that applies to all network users.” (MIT, 
2016). This should be cost-reflective, it should be computed as adequate granularity, and it should 
be non-discriminatory and technology neutral. The prices should ideally be based on both time of 
use and location of use through LMP or even LMP+D and not based on the resource type but rather 
on its patterns of withdrawal, injection, and operational constraints and how that impacts the 
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functioning of the grid; some examples include considerations of load patterns, generation 
availability and its ramping flexibility and production patterns, and of course transmission 
constraints such as congestion (MIT, 2016). In light of the above, it should be stated that this 
cannot be implemented overnight as a matter of fact takes a considerable amount of time to 
properly design the system with much trial and error involved to properly be able to value DER 
services and test the assumptions of how participants will behave on the market and what there 
preferred means of participation are. However, this makes the policy and regulatory agencies all 
the more important as they play a vital role in enabling these developments to occur to pilot and 
demonstration projects that contribute to the development of the optimal economic and regulatory 
infrastructures that must be in place to support these operations and transactions. 
 
Regulation of Competitive Retail in Electricity 
 Recall, that the retail models envisioned in this paper are drastically different from previous 
models as DERs fundamentally alter the business model and present opportunities for retailing 
that previously did not exist, mainly by providing the deployment of assets, aggregation, and 
remote control and dispatch in response to economic signals and system needs. All of these 
activities require connection to the network and access to information regarding both the system 
and the customer meters. Thus there could be some additional category for a license made that 
would cover these activities, determine how they are accessed or shared, and require compliance 
with a code of conducted that would cover this sort of activity. The key to this however, is much 
in line with what was said above is that the overarching goal of a competitive marketplace should 
be kept in mind when designing the regulatory framework that accommodates this type of 
interaction. Specifically, to this point, in creating a license or code of conduct, it should not be 
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restrictive as to hinder or prefer any type of commercial arrangements but rather be open to various 
innovative business models, focusing instead on the protection of data and consumers. 
 
Conclusion  
 Thus the recommendations provided above are aimed at achieving a reconfiguration 
pathway by strategically adjusting elements of the regime by statutory regime actors through 
statutorily-enshrined processes that involve policy, regulatory, and legislative tools. These actions 
are meant to act as the facilitator of niche-cumulation, making it possible for those core processes 
of niche-cumulation mentioned in Part II to develop as to gradually adopt incrementally elements 
of the niche and continuously adjust the regime accordingly. This is because given the statutory 
context and the nature of the regulations, niche-cumulation can develop sufficiently to break into 
the regime because it depends exclusively on the regime to enable the core process of niche-
cumulation, mainly (c) the articulation of various dimensions such as industry structure and 
organizational issues (i.e. grid architecture), market design and (economic) infrastructure 
requirements (i.e. electricity market platform design), and business models (regulation of 
competitive retail in electricity). 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
	   87	  
PART V: WHERE DO WE STAND IN ONTARIO? 
 
 Ontario has infamously experienced drastic policy swings with respect to the electricity 
sector. In the past two decades, Ontario has liberalized its electricity market by disaggregating the 
vertically-integrated monopoly that was Ontario Hydro in several successive crown corporations 
and opened a competitive wholesale market for energy and ancillary services to private investors 
to participate, as well as competitive retailers offering risk hedging for volatile spot market prices 
through locked-in rates. Ontario has subsequently restructured this market into the hybrid model 
with a central load serving entity that is tasked with long-term system planning and 
correspondingly and effectively drove or out diminished the market for retailing (Winfield and 
MacWhirter, 2019). This model persisted throughout the introduction of the Green Energy and 
Green Economy Act, 2009, which prioritized long term procurement of renewable resources that 
get “topped up” by a premium to cover the difference between the price cleared at the wholesale 
market and the guaranteed price as stipulated in the FIT contract. During this time, the Minister of 
Energy took over the role of long-term planning through the LTEP exercise replacing the OPA’s 
IPSP and merged the OPA with the IESO, under the name of the latter and the adopting the role 
of LSE as the counter party to procurement contracts (Vegh, 2016). The current government has 
repealed the Green Energy Act, it repealed Ontario’s carbon trading regime, and as previously 
mentioned rejected to adopting the updated net metering regulations which were key to the IESO 
implementing its DER pilot projects and would have had the effect of enabling new business 
models to appear in Ontario’s market (Stevens, 2018). In light of this, the question is, where do 
we stand in Ontario; are we still on track or is the process of partial decentralization in hiatus? 
 Despite some of the obstacles mentioned above, in my opinion, Ontario’s approach is still 
on the transformation pathway and still has the potential to jump to the reconfiguration pathway 
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although that jump may be later down the road. The downsides of noted changes are the 
cancellation of IESO’s pilot projects which could have contributed greatly to understanding DERs 
as to be able to create structured products on the wholesale market that would enabled their 
participation. Furthermore, the cancellation of the additional revenue that would have come from 
Ontario’s cap-and-trade proceeds would have funded the IESO’s Conservation Fund that could 
further support transitional grid efforts as they funded Alectra’s POWER.HOUSE project (Alectra 
Utilities, 2017). It is well understood that investments that need to be made into the system to 
transition it forward are expensive and will inevitably drive electricity prices up at least in the short 
term (Verbong and Geels, 2010); but it should be noted that not making these investments now 
will drive prices up significantly later down the road. However, on the flipside, we have seen 
progress pursuant to the OEB’s implementation plan, as well as LDCs such as Alectra actively 
trying to innovate and move forward through initiatives like the blockchain energy network it had 
showcased with IBM (IESO, June 2018).  
On the OEB front, the Advisory Committee on Innovation had released its recommendation 
letter outlining the perspective that the OEB should take, subject to the approval of the board. The 
message of delivered by the ACI is telling. In its report, the ACI invites the OEB to contemplate a 
future where energy services are no longer provided solely by LDCs and instead “to embrace new 
players in the marketplace” such as third party providers, DER developers, and customers 
themselves (ACI, 2018). The ACI also cautions the OEB against attempting to predict “what the 
eventual market structure will be” and encourages it to focus on maintaining the integrity of the 
sector (ACI, 2018). The ACI is clearly cognizant of the “prosumer” concept and encourages the 
OEB to invite competition and customer choice into the distribution sector. What is interesting 
about the report is the possibility of inviting market based solutions into the distribution sector 
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evidenced by discussions of a transactive distribution level market, accompanied by guidelines for 
commercial relationships governing the performance of non-traditional resources to utilities and 
customers. The ACI also notes the necessity of enabling LDCs to gradually equip their respective 
networks with advanced power system management technologies as operational visibility and 
control are a precursor to any distribution level market (ACI, 2018). The introduction of a 
“regulatory sandbox” is also an interesting one as it would provide proponents with a forum to test 
the compliance of their activities in a “safe” environment. If the recommendations contained in the 
letter are adopted, then not only would the transformation pathway be well underway but the jump 
to a reconfiguration pathway would be significantly more likely. However, it would require more 
action on part of regime actors, take shape. 
The last point of consideration is the role of incumbents potentially hampering progress 
due to vested interests and resisting what they perceive to be a diversion of revenue streams. Geels 
contemplates this reality in the transitions literature through the introduction of power and politics 
into the MLP (Geels, 2014). According to the literature, regime actors such as incumbent firms 
influence policy makers, leveraging their mutual dependency of economic capital for political 
capital, with an aim to influencing the industry rules through policies that maintain the status quo 
(Geels, 2014). These actors tend to be well organized and have established relationships with 
policy makers. Although I could concede that distributed resources competing against centralized 
assets may be undesirable to the owners of the latter, I do not have enough evidence to support any 
suppositions. However, I think a more important angle to view this clash between incumbents and 
potentially new entrants is at the distribution level between LDCs and third-party DERs developers 
that may exist or appear in the market. This is evident from the EDA’s vision paper, which 
recommends the extension of LDC business activity, updated regulated remuneration frameworks 
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to allow for recovery of new types of investments and expenditures, and the lifting of the restriction 
on ownership of assets and the ability to control BTM DERs. This is more telling to me about the 
desire to continue to dominate the retail electricity market through unregulated affiliates and thus 
control the deployment and integration of DERs. Thus there is evidence on activity on both sides 
of the equation and it remains to be seen how this dynamic will play out as subsequent 
governments, established actors, and innovative firms continue to progress in Ontario, however, 
also in other comparable jurisdictions. 
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